Daily Report

East Europe

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FBIS-EEU-96-052 *15 March 1996*

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OSCE: Lifting of Balkan Arms Embargo Confirmed

AU1403171996 Paris AFP in English
1643 GMT 14 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, March 14 (AFP)—The countries of the former Yugoslavia were able to import light arms again as of Thursday [14 March] with the lifting of a 90-day embargo imposed by the Dayton peace accords.

The embargo had begun on the day of the peace accords' signing in Paris on December 14.

A spokeswoman of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Sarajevo confirmed the lifting of the embargo. While the OSCE oversees limits on heavy arms according to the Dayton terms, no international organisation monitors light arms imports.

A 180-day embargo on heavy weapons sales to ex-Yugoslavia, including aircraft, attack helicopters, tanks, armoured personnel carriers and artillery of 75mm or larger, reached its halfway point on Thursday.

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Albania: Christopher's Statement on Kosova Viewed

AU1503080796 Tirana KOHA JONE in Albanian 14 Mar 96 p 10

[Commentary by Nexhmedin Spahiu: "Diplomacy Outlines U.S. Policy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It is noticeable that Albanian diplomacy follows the same line as U.S. diplomacy on different international issues. This gives the impression that the Republic of Albania is a satellite of the United States. For a state with potential, this would not be a healthy indicator, but for Albania, a state whose integrity is threatened, half of whose territory is occupied, and whose sovereignty is as a result restricted, it is not only no great shame to ride on the coattails of the world's greatest superpower, but might be considered a success.

For instance, over problems relating to Croatia, Bosnia, etc., Albanian diplomacy has used tones identical to U.S. diplomacy. Where Kosova is concerned, people explain the moderation of Albanian diplomacy, to its shame, in the same way. They say that Albanian diplomacy retreated because of its pursuit of the U.S. line. However, an analysis of the recent statements by U.S. and Albanian officials shows this not to be true. In fact, statements by Albanian officials are in much softer tones than those of U.S. officials. The most recent case is Christopher's statement in Belgrade: "We insist on dialogue between Belgrade and the leadership of Kosova." This statement is much more supportive of Kosova than those by Berisha and Serreqi that were issued immediately afterward. "We insist on dialogue between Belgrade and the leadership of the Albanians of Kosova." The subtext of Christopher's declaration was that the United States recognizes the Albanian leadership of Kosova as the leadership of Kosova, because there is no other leadership in Kosova. (There is, for example, no Serbian leadership of Kosova.) Where Christopher considers the leadership of Kosova to be the leadership of a state entity, Berisha and Serreqi consider it merely the leadership of an ethnic group. In fact, Christopher's statement is so strong that it could only have been stronger if he had said, "We insist on dialogue between Belgrade and the leadership of the Republic of Kosova." This time Christopher did not say this, but he did not close the paths to saying it on another occasion.

Between the pitch of the U.S. diplomatic statement and that of the Albanian one, there are many other formulas, one of which would be "We insist on dialogue between Belgrade and the leadership of the province of Kosova." If Christopher had used this term, Belgrade would sleep more easily. However, the statements by Berisha and Serreqi do not even rise that high. This is a surprising fact. It would be natural for the pitch of Albanian diplomacy, where Kosova is concerned, to be higher than that of any other state. It is abnormal to speak in lower tones than the diplomacy of the United States, the only world superpower, over what is an Albanian problem before it is a regional or international problem. It would not even be strange to ask, "What has the Tirana government got against Kosova?"

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Bulgaria: Decisions of BSP Plenum Enumerated

AU1503133796 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 13 Mar 96 p 7

["Decision of the Joint Meeting of the Democratic Left Parliamentary Faction, the BSP Supreme Council, the Aleksandur Stamboliyski BZNS Permanent Board, and the Ecoglasnost Political Club National Council on 10 March 1996"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In general, the one-year rule of the Democratic Left is following the policy lines to which the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP], the Aleksandur Stamboliyski Bulgarian Agrarian National Union [BZNS-AS], and the Ecoglasnost Political Club committed themselves in their election platforms, and there is no need to effect a radical change in this policy.

Noting the results of the one-year rule of the Democratic Left and realizing the great responsibility for successfully implementing the leftist alternative for the transition, the joint meeting decides:

1. To adopt the "Analysis of the One-Year Rule of the Democratic Left and the Tasks of the Executive and Legislative Powers in 1996."

2. To set the following general tasks to consolidate and strengthen the Democratic Left rule:

—to significantly curb criminal activity against the citizens and their property and create conditions for decreasing corruption;

—to achieve more dynamic economic growth and greater financial stability;

—to take effective action to help agrarian producers;

—to accelerate the restoration of ownership of agrarian land and the implementation of the first stage of privatization;

—to improve the administration of state property;

—to halt the decline in real income;

—to effect Bulgaria's participation in the transregional communications projects in the Balkans;

—to continue and intensify the work related to Bulgaria's integration in the European structures;

—to conduct a planned, adequate, and active information policy.

3. To prioritize legislative activity in 1996 and the legislative program of the Democratic Left parliamentary faction for the 1996 winter session.

4. To support the government's intentions to adopt a program of practical action in 1996, and begin its implementation through resources that have been guaranteed. Those programs should be aimed at:

—significantly curbing crime and corruption;

—stimulating agricultural production;

—strengthening the financial sector;

—improving the investment climate;

—reliably stopping the decline in real income and starting a project on transforming one of the basic social security subsystems.

5. The leadership of the Democratic Left parliamentary faction must effect political initiatives aimed at conducting negotiations with parliamentary and extraparliamentary parties on issues of importance to the entire nation, curbing crime and corruption, and implementing mass privatization.

6. Cooperation between the government and the parliamentary faction must improve in all stages of the legislative process and in anything related to parliamentary control. The role of the Democratic Left parliamentary faction in implementing the election platform of the leftist forces and in activating the government must increase.

7. On the basis of the goals and tasks adopted at the meeting, the prime minister must effect the necessary changes in the executive power system.

Bulgaria: Denchev on Nuclear Risks, Power Supply

AU1503125496 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 13 Mar 96 p 6

[Interview with Plamen Denchev, chairman of National Assembly Power Supply Commission, by Tsvetelina Petkova; place and date not given: "We Have Serious Problems With Natural Gas Supply"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Petkova] Mr. Denchev, what are the priority projects of our country's power supply system, and what place does the Belene Nuclear Power Plant have in those projects?

[Denchev] The Belene Nuclear Power Plant is by no means one of the most important factors in our power supply concept. The construction of this project by the turn of the century is not a pressing matter. There are much more important projects, whose construction must be immediately effected. Maritsa-East is the most important among those projects. Resolving the problems of one plant in that complex will also resolve the problems of the mine which supplies it with coal, and vice versa.

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[Petkova] What measures have been adopted following the G-7 protests aimed at improving the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant safety and bring it in line with the international requirements for safe exploitation?

[Denchev] We had many problems until now. The G-7 and the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] are conducting a policy aimed at restricting the nuclear reactors in Eastern Europe and stopping the old Russian-made reactors. The G-7 even questions the international nuclear safety conventions, signed by Bulgaria under the IAEA auspices. It is clear that the Western states also have a commercial interest in the markets, where the Russian reactors were sold. Under the leadership of the Bulgarian Government, we must effect a serious financially guaranteed campaign, aimed at bringing the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant into conformity with international requirements. Only afterward could we talk about replacing the capacities of Kozloduy's two oldest reactors. We need at least four years for the solution of this problem.

[Petkova] What means are necessary for improving the safety of the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant?

[Denchev] The program comprises about $400 million. We need a long period of time and a lot of money. We must not hurry with the construction of the Belene Nuclear Power Plant because problems such as storing nuclear waste and utilizing modern technologies in nuclear power supply have also not been resolved in the Western countries. [passage omitted]

[Petkova] Does Bulgaria have any alternative for its power supply in the 21st century?

[Denchev] It would be imprudent to refrain from developing our nuclear power supply. The production of nuclear energy activates the entire economic system of the country. The nuclear power supply is ecologically clean, while air pollution continues to be a world problem at the turn of the century. The only drawback is the risk involved in nuclear power supply. However, this risk could be restricted to a minimum if modern technologies are utilized. The utilization of gas energy is an important alternative. This is the "energy hit" of our time. However, Bulgaria encounters serious problems with the guaranteed supply of natural gas. According to recent studies the price of this raw material will increase. Long-term intergovernmental agreements between Bulgaria and Russia are necessary. Such agreements will allow the basic "players" in this business to carry out the market supply.

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Czech Republic: Ministers Criticize Primakov on NATO

LD1403134696 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 14 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov has indicated in the past few days the readiness of Russia to agree to the acceptance of the Central European countries to NATO, but only if NATO does not spread military structures into the new states. How does the Czech Republic react to this change? Prague correspondent Daniela Galikova replies:

[Galikova] Primakov's statement has evoked an almost immediate reaction from the Czech Foreign Ministry. One cannot say that the Czech Republic welcomes this initiative with enthusiasm. Czech Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec, for example, has said that he had previously noted indications of the change of the Russian attitude. This time, however, and for the first time, there has been a public formulation that, in his view, represents a culmination of a certain development. But the following statement by Minister Zieleniec is particularly telling: It is obvious to us that the discussion on possible modalities of our membership in NATO is a discussion inside NATO. It certainly is not for our discussion with Russia, the Czech foreign minister said, and added that membership in NATO, apart from advantages, also means duties, and Prague does not intend to avoid them.

Czech Interior Minister Jan Ruml did not even try to be diplomatic when commenting on Primakov's words: I do not think Mr. Primakov, former head of counterintelligence, should decide about our fate, about our security, about what pact we should be members of. He should not forget that we are a sovereign state, and I will consistently defend the idea of noninterference in our affairs, Interior Minister Ruml said. [passage omitted]

Czech Republic: Commentary Rejects Russia's NATO 'Offer'

AU1403135596 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 13 Mar 96 p 12

[Commentary by Lubos Palata: "Moscow Is Offering a Poor Solution"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Russia's tentative offer to accept NATO's enlargement by the Central European states, as long as this just involves political membership, is not a proposal the Czech Republic could embrace. Prague must continue to strive for full membership in the alliance, including participation in its military structures.

At the same time, in their dealings with Moscow, Brussels and Washington should propose to the Russians a compliant move based on logic completely the opposite of Primakov's most recent gesture. Instead of voluntarily limiting its activities in Central Europe, the alliance should, on the contrary, expand its activity as much as possible toward Russia and continue to present conciliatory ideas to Moscow about the opportunities for strategic partnership.

Only such a dramatic gesture, and not a concessionary stratagem in the form of the "entry-nonentry" into the alliance of the candidate countries, is a step toward the future. Acceding to Primakov's offer would be to mark time in the past and accept the outdated principle of spheres of influence. By its merely political membership, Central Europe would then continue to be a gray zone, albeit with a slightly pro-Western tinge.

To many politicians in the West and also in Prague, Primakov's proposal will seem like an attractive option that would eliminate a bitter clash with Moscow. If, however, the alliance's leading countries and the Central Europeans accede to this compromise, they will merely bolster the position of those forces in Moscow who declare that NATO is a hostile pact directed against the Russians. At the same time, the task is to convince Moscow that the alliance's enlargement as far east as possible is not against the interests of the Russians. Until this happens, the continent will continue to be divided by a psychological iron curtain. The alliance, as a zone of stability and democracy, should not present a threat to Russia, but a superlative option for development.

Primakov has again made it clear by his latest offer that the Kremlin refuses to accept this logic. If NATO were to accede to his proposal, it would thus be endorsing Russia's belief that the alliance is Russia's eternal enemy.

Czech Republic: Holan Said To Favor F-16's

96P20337A

[FBIS Report] Returning from his early March visit to Washington, Defense Minister Vilem Holan indicated that he leans toward acquiring F-16 aircraft from the U.S. and was unimpressed by an unexpected Swedish offer of JAS-35 Gripen aircraft, Czech press reports indicate. Asked about the Swedish offer, which was apparently made on the eve of his visit to the U.S., Holan was "reserved" in his reply, focusing instead on his meeting with U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry, reported DENNI TELEGRAF on 5 March. Without going into details, Holan said that Secretary Perry's elaboration of the available options will enable the Czech Government to make "a faster decision on revitalizing the Air Force." Suggesting that he prefers the known advantages of the Washington deal, which has been the subject of long

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negotiations, to an attractive but unexplored possibility, Holan said that the Swedish offer reminded him of the saying "Better an egg today than a hen tomorrow." He indicated that he does not welcome the "submission of ever newer suggestions," saying that sometimes it is more important to make a decision than to delay in hopes of making "the absolutely optimal choice."

According to an article in the weekly RESPEKT (11 February), the U.S. offer involves "the gradual acquisition" by the Czech Republic of "24 older F-16 type-A aircraft from the arsenal of the U.S. Army." The mixed Czech-U.S. commission of experts that prepared the plan took into consideration, the paper said, the views of "Polish and Hungarian specialists." The article said that coordination with Poland and Hungary would be advisable because they are "embarking on the same road" as the Czech military, and it is desirable for Central Europe to "have a compatible air force."

Before Holan returned from Washington and indicated his continued preference for the U.S. deal, the Prague daily MLADA FRONTA DNES (1 March) had described the Swedish offer as "unusually lucrative." The Swedes, the newspaper wrote, were offering Prague "brand new Gripens for the same price as the older, modernized F-16 aircraft offered by the Americans." The fact that the Swedish fighter has a "U.S. General Electric-Volvo engine manufactured under license increases its chances," the paper said, adding that the offer reportedly envisaged the Czechs "purchasing seven Gripens in the years 1999-2000."

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Slovakia: Schenk Explains Rationale for NATO Application

LD1403140196 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 14 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Slovakia's security policy and European security structures were discussed at a news conference at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs today. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent Tamara Valkova] [passage omitted] Here is what Foreign Minister Juraj Schenk had to say:

[Begin Schenk recording] There is nothing unusual about the fact that Slovakia, given its size and economic and defense potentials, is not capable of securing and fully guaranteeing its own security exclusively on its own. Therefore, it is looking for guarantees in this integration process [into NATO].

We have said on several occassions, and I will say it once again, that Slovakia does not feel itself to be militarily threatened by anyone and that no country can feel threatened by Slovakia, either. Therefore, we consider regional cooperation and very good neighborly relations to be an important component of multilateral consultations and a very important aspect of our security policy.

Integration into the North Atlantic alliance is an unquestionable priority for Slovakia. We regard NATO as the most efficient existing security organization capable of reacting in an adequate and effective manner to all potential security problems in the central and eastern European region. Therefore, we see NATO's enlargement—toward Central and East Europe, of course—as a natural process of increasing stability and democracy. We do not see it as a process of enlargement of some sort of anti-Russian alliance.

The purpose of our integration is to improve our capability to implement our own national interests, to meet the goals of our security, and to increase the level of cooperation with all countries. [end recording]

[Valkova] Juraj Schenk went on to say that any speculation or statements about neutrality being the right choice for Slovakia's future security policy are contrary to the official standpoints of government bodies and to the government's manifesto. He said that the statements in support of Slovakia's neutrality are statements of private individuals and civic or political initiatives and that he sees them as an internal democratic debate on Slovakia's security policy.

Slovakia: HZDS on 'Misleading' State Department Report

AU1403120996 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 12 Mar 96 p 1

[Report by TASR: "HZDS Political Board on the Present Situation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] Political Board dealt with the present political situation at a regular meeting in Bratislava yesterday. It voiced, among other things, regret over some misleading passages of the U.S. State Department Report on Human Rights concerning the situation in the Slovak Republic.

Regarding the domestic political sphere, the Political Board pointed to the continuing unwillingness of the president of the republic, Michal Kovac, to cooperate, in spite of his recently proclaimed accommodating approach. The president of the Republic again confirmed this—by now chronically known—attitude a few days ago, when he rejected the government's proposal to nominate Olga Keltosova as ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary, head of the Slovak Republic's permanent mission with the UN.

Slovakia: Commentary Diagnoses 'Constitutional Crisis'

AU1303160596 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 11 Mar 96 p 3

[Commentary by Jan Szelepcsenyi: "Who Is Putting Leaden Boots on the Republic's Feet?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] What happened on Thursday [7 March] had been expected by the public: The President's Office announced that the president had refused to sign Olga Keltosova's letter of appointment as head of the Slovak Republic's permanent mission with the UN. The reason? Mrs. Keltosova was not willing to dissociate herself publicly from the government statement of 19 September 1995, in which the Government of the Slovak Republic stated before the domestic and international public that, to put it politely, the president is not the right man for the job because he acts against the interests of the Slovak Republic in way in which he carries out his office. Olga Keltosova was supposed to dissociate herself from the statement of a government of which she was, and still is, a member.

This was, indeed, a peculiar gesture, whose significance and consequences deserve a more thorough analysis. If Olga Keltosova accepted the "deal" offered her, she would have had the letter of appointment in her hand, but the government would have been forced

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immediately to revoke her nomination for the post, as one can scarcely imagine an ambassador serving abroad who had "parted ways" with the government of the country. In other words, the consequence would be the cancellation of the proposal and the government would lose both a minister and an ambassador. The president, too, must have been aware of this. This is why the offer that he made to Olga Keltosova can by no means be understood as an "accommodating" gesture but, rather, as the opposite—a well-aimed blow.

Hidden behind this dimension of the case is, however, yet another one. It is less conspicuous but all the more horrifying. What I have in mind is the dimension of cooperation among our constitutional officials or bodies—president, government, and parliament. In his public pronouncements, the president keeps stressing that the distrust voiced in him by parliament and the government does not have any legal validity, which is why everyone will have to get used to the status quo, which also tends to be referred to as constitutional. And, indeed, even the public has let itself be hoodwinked. We all had the impression that the government would be attending to the government's business, parliament to parliament's, and the president to the president's—in no great harmony but, and this is what counts, constitutionally.

However, the nonappointment of Olga Keltosova makes visible an important fact: Our country has found itself in a constitutional crisis, because communication between the President's Office on the one hand and parliament and the government on the other is not working. Any legislative act by parliament or executive act by the government is subjected by the president not only to a substantive analysis of its contents, but also to an analysis from a partisan or purely subjective viewpoint. In other words, before the president formally gives his consent to anything with his signature, first he ponders whether it suits him politically and then whether it is in conformity with his personal or even family interests. Even when he appears in court as a witness testifying in a family case, he manipulates information that he obtained not as a citizen but as president and that, as long as this information is not conclusively proven, seriously harms the interests and the honor of state institutions and individuals.

These acts of defiance create totally absurd situations. To give an example: Internal foreign service regulations prescribe the rotation of personnel after a certain term of office. Ambassadors are now forced to serve beyond their term simply because the president is not ready to sign a single letter of recall. And vacant positions will remain vacant for a long time, because the president apparently will not be ready to sign a letter of appointment for a single individual proposed by the Meciar government. At the same time, let us be honest about it: Many of the president's powers found their way into the Constitution not in order to improve the quality of decisions through the president's participation in the decisionmaking process, but to give a certain social framework to the appointment of an ambassador, professor, and suchlike. When these more or less social formalities become an instrument of political struggle, it is as if someone were putting leaden boots on the republic's feet. Even the smallest step requires immense efforts. In the event of our state finding itself in border situations, this inability of constitutional officials to cooperate could have catastrophic consequences for the fate of the state as a whole. I doubt whether it is still possible to consider this state of affairs constitutional. We should therefore expeditiously seek constitutional st[illegible] to set it right.

Slovakia: Liscak Comments on [illegible]isubversion Legislation

AU1403134396 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 13 Mar 96 pp 1-2

[Interview with Slovak Justice Minister Jozef Liscak by "kap"-signed SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA correspondent; place and date not given: "Penal Code Amendment Should Be Approved by Deputies in March"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] *Bratislava—One of the three points on the agenda of last week's extraordinary cabinet meeting was a draft amendment to the currently valid Penal Code. We asked Justice Minister Jozef Liscak for details.* [passage omitted]

[SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA] The public will probably take foremost interest in changes in the wording of some provisions of Chapter One of the Penal Code.

[Liscak] There are certain gaps [rezervy] in the valid legal system with regard to protection against crimes against the republic, compared with penal code regulations in tens of advanced democratic countries, particularly as far as protection of territorial integrity, independence, defense capability of the state, and representatives of the state is concerned. The submitted amendment is trying to close them. The Constitution of the Slovak Republic safeguards, on the one hand, protective role in relation to the republic and basic political rights but, at the same time, it allows for the possibility to limit the enactment of these rights, if this is necessary to protect the rights and freedoms of others, the security of the state, and the like. This is why it is stated in the first paragraph of the newly introduced Article 92b that he who organizes public rallies of citizens with the intention of subverting the constitutional system or territorial integrity or with the intention of destroying the

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republic's independence is criminally liable. The same applies to a Slovak citizen, or a person without citizenship permanently resident on the territory of our state, who deliberately spreads abroad false information damaging to the interests of the republic. In putting forward this draft, we proceeded from the premise that its aforementioned articles are in conformity with the Slovak Constitution as well as with the European Human Rights Convention.

[SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA] You mentioned that, in drafting the amendment, you were taking into consideration experience from other democratic countries. Could you give some example?

[Liscak] To name just one example, let me mention France, which protects its republic very precisely. Chapter IV [Roman Four] of the Penal Code of 1 March 1994 on crimes and offenses against the nation, state, and public order, but also other provisions, include protection of the basic interests of the nation, as which the French consider, for example, independence, territorial integrity, security, and protection of the population.

[SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA] The draft amendment is now halfway through the legislative process. When do you expect its discussion in the National Council of the Slovak Republic plenum?

[Liscak] I will personally insist that this happens at the March meeting of parliament.

Slovakia: Ministers Speak to Press via Spokesmen

AU1403163896 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 13 Mar 96 p 2

[Article by Lubos Jurina and Juraj Alner: "According to Jan Ducky, Trade Expansion to Russia Presupposes Establishment of Special Bank"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Bratislava—The first part of the news conference following yesterday's cabinet meeting was attended by Economy Minister Jan Ducky. The last news conference attended by government members was held at the Slovak Government Office a year ago. In the wake of the publication of the text "Alarm" in a number of dailies on 6 March 1995 [in protest against planned government measures perceived as a threat to the economic foundations of the print media], the cabinet decided to communicate with journalists at news conferences only through spokesmen. Government spokeswoman Ludmila Bulakova termed yesterday's step "an expression of the government's accommodating attitude toward the journalist community." This accommodating attitude was limited to three questions that could by asked by three journalists. Asked whether the prime minister would also be attending the news conferences, Ludmila Bulakova said: "Wait and see." [passage omitted]

The government approved a long-term program for the development of railroads. It foresees the radical modernization of three railroad corridors with the aim of increasing the operational speed to 160 km per hour or, respectively, 140 km per hour. The first corridor on the Slovak territory is Kuty-Bratislava-Sturovo (route from Germany to the Balkans), the second connects Bratislava and Kosice, via Zilina (en route from Austria to Ukraine), and the third corridor is Zilina-Cadca-Skalite (direction to Poland). According to preliminary calculations, the cost of the modernization program will reach 25.5-35.5 billion Slovak korunas. It will be financed from the Slovak Railroads' profit and from state-guaranteed credits. The completion of the modernization program is scheduled for 2002. [passage omitted]

[Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak on 13 March on page 2 carries a 300-word report by Nora Sliskova on the 12 March cabinet meeting. Referring to the "return, after one year, of cabinet members to the Tuesday briefings," the report mentions that "government spokeswoman Ludmila Bulakova specified that these would not be regular news conferences but, rather, so-called 10-minute press briefings and that, each time, only one minister would partic pate in them."]

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Hungary: 'Liberal Communist' Government Denounced

LD1403191296 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1800 GMT 14 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] According to the opposition Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP], Hungarians are again at the crossroads, and this time the national aim is to remove the liberal communist government. This is what Miklos Gaspar, one of the KDNP deputy chairmen, has said. At the 15 March commemoration [of the 1848 revolution] in the Pilvax cafe the Christian Democrats' demands were summed up in 12 points. Among them is a general pay rise of 30 percent, the creation of an effective family support system, the completion of a self-government system operating on the principle of the sovereignty of the people, and a true freedom of the press. Miklos Gaspar said of the latter that the current power is suffocating the opposition press.

Hungary: Thousands Attend Antigovernment Rally

LD1403191896 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1700 GMT 14 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The rally to say farewell to the government [kormanybucsuztato] organized by the Independent Smallholders' Party [FKGP] at the Petoefi statue in Budapest is beginning at the moment. It is planned that the demonstrators will proceed to the Kossuth Square where Jozsef Torgyan [FKGP party chairman] will make a speech. Gyoergyi Nemeth is at the scene.

[Nemeth] Good evening from the Petoefi statue in Marcius 15 Square. It is difficult to say exactly, but there are approximately 2,000-3,000 people here. Banners are stating from which district or town people have arrived. Signatures are being collected at several parts of the square; as an elderly woman said, this is how they are preparing to topple the government. They are expecting to collect approximately 2 million signatures.

A new paper is also being introduced with an introductory issue. It is called NEW TIMES [UJ IDOEK] and Gyula Fekete, Sandor Csoori, and Gergely Pongracz are among its authors.

The crowd is reasonably calm. Following the national anthem, Jozsef Torgyan, FKGP chairman, has just begun his speech. So far he has called on the government to resign and added that this country belonged to the Hungarians.

The rally, which was advertised as an event to say goodbye to the government, will continue at 1900 [1800 GMT] at Kossuth Square in front of the parliament building. Back to the studio.

[Later in the news bulletin, Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian at 1700 GMT on 14 March continues its coverage of the demonstration in Marcius 15 Square:

[Correspondent Nemeth reports: "Geza Gyimothy, deputy chairman of the FKGP, said they will ask for the people's help so the middle class can find its place in society and unemployment can be eliminated.

"Miklos Hasznos, parliamentary deputy of the KDNP [Christian Democratic People's Party], termed the crowd as a rally for the replacement of the government. According to the deputy, the only thing the Horn government can do is increase taxes. By the way, the crowd tried to hiss at Miklos Hasznos twice. The speakers, however, called for quiet and order, saying they will have to prove they are not a demagogic lot."

Hungary: FKGB Leader Addresses Budapest Rally

LD1403232996 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 2100 GMT 14 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Karoly Levai reports on the rally of the Independent Smallholders' Party [FKGP] entitled Farewell to the Government.

[Levai] [Passage omitted] In his Kossuth Square address, FKGP Chairman Jozsef Torgyan said that the Hungarian people reject the nation-destroying policy pursued by Gyula Horn and his government. He is of the view that the country and nation are in extreme peril.

[Begin Torgyan recording] The Liberal-Bolshevik danger that is threatening our country at present is greater than any other danger to date because in the past few years the country has suffered greater damages than the total damages in World War II, owing to the Bolshevik takeover of power and extension of this power to property. They have made more than 70 percent of the national assets disappear. You must see that they have done so to paralyze the acting power of the Hungarian people.

We, however, cannot be paralyzed. We are Hungarians. In spring, the Hungarian man usually clears away the vermin. Let us also clear away the vermin. [audience cheers] [end recording] [passage omitted]

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Hungary: KDNP Leader Views Opposition's Chances

AU1303101296 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 9 Mar 96 p 7

[Interview with Gyorgy Giczy, chairman of the Christian Democratic People's Party (KDNP), by Attila Kristof; place and date not given: "A Process of Purification in the Opposition—Giczy on the Alliance, Nine Prime-Ministerial Candidates, and the Chances of Christian Democracy"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Kristof] Apart from the stability of the Federation of Young Democrats-Hungarian Civic Party [FIDESZ-MPP], only Jozsef Torgyan maintains unity in the Independent Smallholders Party [FKGP] with his amazing authority. Does this mean that the FKGP is the only nonliberal and non-left-wing group in Hungary that is homogeneous politically and ideologically?

[Giczy] In my view, unity cannot only be based on authority.

[Kristof] I mean that, from the outside at least, Torgyan's authoritative personality is a component of unity.

[Giczy] Well, the FKGP is united. There is no doubt about that. It is a different matter if someone likes the circumstances of this unity. However, let us not just look at the opposition. The operation of the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] is actually exemplary. The extreme liberalism represented by them should be present in a minor party of a small stratum. However, they came out of the last elections as a strong medium-sized party. Is it not possible that this is also the result of authoritativeness? It is also well known and indisputable that a one-party discipline prevails in the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] and in the MSZP's voting base, which the opposition parties obviously cannot expect to have. A party's politics can be approached from many angles. Success is one of the most important angles.... [passage omitted]

[Kristof] We will later come to how the elections can be won, but I note that Torgyan, whenever he gets the chance, praises you. Why?

[Giczy] Torgyan likes me. [passage omitted]

[Kristof] I imagine what applies to all parties is that you know them from their fruits. When will the time come for these fruits to be properly known, and for how many trees that bring good fruit does the Hungarian right have space?

[Giczy] I always think that all opposition parties should work together, if possible. For example, I am very interested in the secondary party preferences of various parties. This is not a matter of whether a leading politician sympathizes with another. The question is to what extent the party membership and the party's supporters sympathize with each other. When it comes to light that the secondary party preferences of the KDNP [Christian Democratic People's Party] are the Hungarian Democratic Party [MDF] and the FKGP almost neck and neck, and vice versa, then I do not think that any politician can ignore this fact. However, the SZDSZ continues to be the FIDESZ's secondary party preference. This is thought provoking. We are elected officers, we get our power and tasks from our party's membership and supporters, therefore, we cannot conduct our politics independent of them. It has to be accepted that, in a sociological sense, the voting bases of the KDNP and FKGP are close to each other. From this point on, rather than whether Torgyan likes me or I like him, the important matter is what our voters want. This we should never forget. With the idea of the civic alliance, I felt that sections of the parties' leading elites had already agreed without actually asking the electorate. This is the reason I consider the assumption that this kind of alliance would mean a big voter base and that the votes would be added together to be unfounded. [Passage omitted]

[Kristof] My argument is that, precisely from the viewpoint of the electors, it does not do any good for the self-confidence of voters who have Christian, civic, or conservative value preferences if the opposition seems incapable of making an alliance, acting jointly, or even of mutually respecting each other.

[Giczy] Naturally, for an opposition that only has 28 percent in legislation, it is vitally important to work together. This is precisely the reason I emphasize that the 11 November decision of our national committee is always one-sidedly misinterpreted. Although this decision says that we would not form party alliances, we want to help the cooperation of opposition parties in legislation and in the local governments. The KDNP has always had a willingness for cooperation. We are not in the position that we could not accept and fulfill a bridging role due to our reservations or bad relationship with any of the opposition parties—this is also in our 11 November decision. Unfortunately, some of the opposition parties do not tolerate some others' company, or not even their own.

[Kristof] Obviously, it is difficult to bridge the stylistic conflicts....

[Giczy] It is through actions rather than on the level of political declarations and style where it is decided what a political force wants. When I talk about cooperation based on big and broad national unity which, in my

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view, is the only force capable of defeating the government coalition, I also find some past events problematic. I also find it worrying that the FIDESZ has included the term "civic" in its name. If they want to create a civic alliance and call it that, then it is not good to have the key word in the name of one of the participating parties.

[Kristof] Do you think that this could lead to monopolization?

[Giczy] Obviously. And I will say something else. I am not interested—this is not meant as a criticism of the FIDESZ—in having a liberal alternative presented to the electors both on the left and the right wing.

[Kristof] In my view, decisive differences exist in this respect between the left and the right wing. The FIDESZ is not the SZDSZ and, in fact, their relationship is tense and cold at the moment.

[Giczy] Hungarian voters have already had surprises in the few years since the change of the regime. Let us remember how cool relations were between the MSZP and the SZDSZ at the time. [passage omitted]

[Kristof] What if all parties ran separately in the elections and the current proportions remained and, perhaps, the FKGP could form a coalition government. With whom?

[Giczy] You should ask Torgyan about this. I would be happy if an opposition party wins and I do not want to wish anything negative, especially not to the FKGP, but I am convinced that many things will change by the time of the elections. For example, what happens if the SZDSZ leaves the government and joins the civic alliance at the same time? People say that Ivan Szabo [former parliamentary leader of the MDF, now head of Hungarian Democratic People's Party] is a liberal, but I do not think so. The civic alliance, if it had been set up, would have had a liberal dominance. If this is moderately liberal, it is still liberal. [passage omitted] Now I ask, is the national side saved, or shall we return to the thought that what is at stake for Hungarian democracy is whether the electors realize what is happening in politics and can choose the party they really want. Therefore, I say that, if the KDNP wants to remain in a position to be elected, it has to remain recognizable at all costs.

Hungary: Editorial Examines Political Fracture Lines

AU1303102996 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 9 Mar 96 p 3

[Editorial by Pal Eotvos: "Poles"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The commotion we have witnessed recently on the opposition side of our political life, a commotion that former party chairman Lajos Fur called "an event that exceeds every previous disintegration and destruction" is actually the aftermath of a much earlier series of events. The current series of events connected with Sandor Lezsak, Gyorgy Giczy, Ivan Szabo, Peter Boross, or Tamas Isepy are simply aftereffects of a previous tectonic movement that took place in the depths of Hungarian society. These events have been legitimate.

1. In the 1994 elections, the big fault line of Hungarian society was reorganized, and not only the Left or the Right, the social-liberal and conservative sides, or other similar political entities made up of opposing parties. If you like, a 200-year division in the Hungarian society, a division on selecting the road to modernization has probably come to a final end today. The flareup of the period between 1990-94 was the last opportunity for Hungary caught in the dilemma of "homeland or progress" to attempt to solve its development by choosing some kind of an independent national or third road separate from the European modernization. This national road became so compromised between 1990-94 that Hungary no longer seems to be able to politically organize along this line or along some variation of this road, unless an extraordinary situation of extreme peril and total collapse takes place.

2. The most natural reflex in a deep crisis is that society is seeking forces of cohesion and development, and the power of the nation and the feeling of belonging to a nation are the most tangible such forces in certain situations (and the situation in Central-East Europe is typically so). After the collapse of the Yalta system, without exception, all the countries of this region in deep crisis seemed to regard national coherence as the greatest social driving force, and this continues to be the case more or less today. In any case, with the exception of Slovenia and Austria, progress continues to be offered this way for the society in every other neighbor to Hungary, namely Slovakia, Urkaine, Romania, the Serb Yugoslavia, and Croatia, mostly as a continuation of the former regime on national bases.

With their decision, the voters in the 1994 elections drastically cut Hungary out of this Central East-European neighborhood region. It is another matter

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what the consequences of all this are for the ethnic Hungarians living in the neighboring countries and what opportunities all this creates for Hungary's endeavor to join Europe. The essential thing is that Hungary has become totally different from its neighbors.

3. With this, with the exception of the goods offered by Jozsef Torgyan, the Hungarian political market has again become temporarily monopolized. The national-based opposition alternative has actually ceased to exist. The opposition has lost the ground from under its feet. The fact that the coalition's economic and social policy does not leave much to offer to a moderate right-wing opposition either made the opposition even more desperate and hopeless. Today, the government coalition is doing things that the opposition should do if they were in power. Total loss of ground is the reason behind the disintegration of the opposition, or the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] in this case, rather than its pale intellectual strength, the traditional feud between Hungarian political parties, Fur's weakness, Lezsak's Jesuitism, and Ivan Szabo's ambitions. Even if there had been geniuses and phenomena here, they would only have been better in the sense that they would have realized earlier that they had been cornered and, thus, they would have also found the way out earlier.

4. One can hardly emphasize the urgent need for the opposition to find a way out, first of all because real opportunity for power rotation is the essence of parliamentary democracy. A disintegrated opposition lying in the sand can only be a temporary phenomenon because a lasting lack of opposition could lead to temptations to violate democracy. Therefore, a qualified opposition is vital for a social-liberal government. Dangerous government arrogance (which we are witnessing with increased frequency) is not primarily a matter of self-restraint. Likewise, the ethical standard of those in power does not depend primarily on their internal intentions. And there are also frequent signs that the moral stand of the government is weakening: the number of unclear and suspicious contacts and incomprehensible relations is on the increase. It shows the sensitivity of the Hungarian society in this respect that, no matter that the Antall-Boross government avoided any serious social conflict and it increased Hungary's state debt from more than 1,000 billion to more than 5,000 billion [currency not specified] in the course of four years to avoid the aforementioned conflicts, all this did not help them. Both its helplessness and retrograde character, as well as its lack of moral credibility led to its demise. Moral credit is even more essential for a government "luxuriating" in inevitable restrictive measures.

There is an acute danger in not knowing where the opposition forces will gather and what they will emphasize after the imminent collapse of the moderate center Right. Will they gather around the clarifying possibilities of the remaining center Right, or at its existing poles regarded as extremist in comparison? If the latter represents the national character and defends honesty in the morally sensitive society and social sensitivity in the midst of social tensions, it will be difficult to predict the consequences today. A "two-pole" rotation of socialist-liberal and populist-retrograde governments is unknown in the world, mostly because, in this system, the switch is generally turned only once, and then it usually stays the same.

Hungary: New Media Official Assesses Tasks, Prospects

AU1503081996 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 14 Mar 96 p 9

[Interview with Mihaly Tamas Revesz, chairman of the National Radio and Television Body, by Dezso Pinter; place and date not given: "We Cannot Give Up Our Ideals"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Pinter] As the chairman of the National Radio and Television Body [ORTT], have you encountered your first success and disappointment?

[Revesz] I was elected two weeks ago and, after such a short time, I can mostly speak of some kind of a basic mood. The way I see it, our society has not yet come to realize that, with the establishment of the ORTT, a constitutional state body emerged that will bring Hungary even closer to the Western-type bourgeois democracies. Nor could the television viewers and radio listeners realize that a body and cultural center has emerged that is primarily aimed at serving the interests of the viewers and listeners. [passage omitted]

[Pinter] What conditions will the ORTT consider when issuing tenders from the land-broadcast national commercial television channel?

[Revesz] We do not want to find ready-made models here; instead, we will draw conclusions from the positive aspects and the mistakes of European reorganization. We want to avoid an international or domestic concentration here. The law gives clear stipulations for the conditions of tenders. The elements of the system of conditions will effect each other: If we increase the obligatory percentage of broadcasting public service programs, we will not be able to increase the concession fees too much.

[Pinter] Is it possible that, after issuing tenders, domestic and foreign firms will come which have not yet been active in the Hungarian media activity? How can

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you decide which contender will observe the written promises?

[Revesz] We expect the arrival of new firms. The situation will be relatively simple with the domestic firms, because their intellectual background is all we will have to take into consideration, as well as their market attitude in previous years. As for the foreign firms, all of them had the opportunity to come to Hungary or to cooperate with Hungarian institutions and firms in the past six years. If a contender has been operating one or several commercial channels for some years, it will be possible for us to draw certain conclusions on what kind of programs we can expect from him. [passage omitted]

[Pinter] Have you experienced any open or hidden political pressure since your election as head of the ORTT?

[Revesz] I have not experienced any such pressure and I do not expect any such pressure in the future either. The political parties probably understand that the ORTT members are not delegates, but personalities nominated by the parties, personalities who cannot be influenced.

[Pinter] Allow me to express my doubts. If, nevertheless, you come across party policy pressure, will you simply disregard the attempt or will you publicly reject this?

[Revesz] It would be a mistake to answer publicly. Only a politician can reply to political arguments. I am not a politician. So I will disregard the attempts. [passage omitted]

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B-H: Muratovic, Croatian PM Discuss Economic Accords

AU1403213996 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 14 Mar 96

[Report by Mladen Bosnjak on news conference by Croatian Prime Minister Zlatko Matesa and Hasan Muratovic, Bosnia-Herzegovina Republic prime minister, in Sarajevo on 14 March—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Bosnjak] During the previous meeting in Split, it was stated that another meeting would take place in mid-March. The meeting, which took place today among the governmental delegations, means a big step forward in defining and regulating significant segments of relations between the Republic of Croatia and the Republic and Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Croatian Prime Minister Zlatko Matesa was the first to issue a statement on the meeting.

[Matesa] On this occasion as well, we discussed all topics of mutual interest and, as you already may know, we signed a number of interstate agreements on railroad and road traffic and interstate border passages, as well as a memorandum that defines the basis for taking a joint approach toward international financial institutions when dealing with projects that are of strategic interest for both states. We also discussed some bilateral questions on implementing the federation. Even though there are some problems, we feel that they are not so large as to call into question the federation itself. The Croatian delegation expressed full support for the efforts made by all the leading people of the federation to resolve such problems, which normally surface when implementing an idea, so as to suit the interests of both peoples in the best possible way.

[Muratovic] I am sure that these agreements and contracts, which we want to keep in the future, will considerably influence a quicker functioning of the federation and the agreements that we are signing now, and which will certainly be implemented, will contribute toward regulating certain relations in the federation that would be much more difficult and slower to regulate from the inside. Before you ask me, I should tell you that we wanted and planned to sign two more agreements today regarding the port of Ploce and property rights relations. We discussed these two contracts today, and I think that we have fully defined the principles on which the two contracts will be based. I want to point out once again that in the case of the Ploce port, it is purely an economic contract concerning pure business and, of course, is about a specific relationship between the two countries, which may only be beneficial in economic terms for both of them, and any postponement of concluding that contract can only be at both Croatia's and Bosnia-Herzegovina's detriment in terms of the economy. I hope that we will continue the talks next week at the expert level so that the signing of these two agreements will happen soon.

[Bosnjak] In response to two or three questions on some current problems—for example, the organization of authorities in Sarajevo and the functioning of the federation police—the prime ministers replied with almost identical answers. Mr. Muratovic said:

[Muratovic] Within considerations regarding all the current, key questions about the federation, we have decided to form a team of responsible persons involving the Bosniak and the Croatian side in Bosnia-Herzegovina that will assess all those questions in the shortest possible time and introduce the federation bodies to them.

[Bosnjak] Mr. Matesa confirmed this and underlined:

[Matesa] In addition to what the prime minister just said, I have to repeat that we consider it to be the best way that the leading people of the Bosniak and the Croatian peoples sit down at a negotiating table and clarify those situations one by one within the question of general viability of the project of the federation, but what is important is the Croatian state's, the Croatian leadership's, and the Croatian Government's clear attitude that there is no alternative to the federation.

[Muratovic] We have also agreed that all the things disputed in a way have already been regulated by the previous agreements, the Constitution. The issue of Sarajevo is regulated by the Constitution, the issue of Mostar is regulated by the Rome agreement, among things, and we stick to our stance that we should consistently implement what we have agreed upon before, because all the disputes are actually caused by insufficient, that is, inconsistent implementation of what has already been agreed upon.

[Bosnjak] The news conference ended with Matesa's answer to how matters regarding Croatian property in Bosnia-Herzegovina will be settled and vice versa.

[Matesa] The basic principle is the protection of private ownership. Both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia are law-governed states and private property is a constitutional category. Other principles will be discussed at the expert group level and, as the prime minister said, we expect that the expert groups for the agreements on the Ploce port and property rights will continue their work next week.

[Bosnjak] A new meeting of the government delegations of Croatia and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina can be expected to take place soon involving probably

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the same people. In addition to Prime Minister Matesa, the Croatian delegation included Foreign Minister Mate Granic, Deputy Prime Minister Ljerka Minkas-Hodak, and Zeljko Lugavec, minister for maritime traffic, transport, and communications. The Bosnia-Hezegovina delegation consisted of Federation Prime Minister Izudin Kapetanovic, his deputy Drago Bilandzija, Federation Foreign Minister Jadranko Prlic, Federation Interior Minister Avdo Hebib, and many more.

B-H: Alispahic Dismisses US Concerns of Iranian Influence

AU1503094296 Paris AFP in English 0821 GMT 15 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Washington, March 15 (AFP)—Bakir Alispahic, head of a Bosnian security agency whose dismissal is sought by Washington for his alleged links to Iranian terrorists, told The WASHINGTON POST he will not quit and dismissed U.S. concerns as "very silly."

"There is an American idea to remove Iranian influence here. This is what they are trying to do by attacking me," the 39-year-old war hero and top aide to Bosnian Preisdent Alija Izetbegovic said in an interview published Friday.

Alispahic heads the new Bosnian Agency for Investigation and Documentation which he said is tasked with capturing war criminals, fighting terrorism and crime, but which U.S. officials contend assumes police functions disallowed under the Dayton peace agreements.

He confirmed that his organization ran a site near Fojnica which North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces raided on February 15 claiming it was a terrorist training camp.

Three members of the Iranian Interior Ministry were captured there, along with weapons and explosive devices that included booby-trapped toys, which NATO said were in violation of the Dayton agreements calling for all foreign forces to be withdrawn from Bosnia by January 19.

Alispahic denied in his interview that the camp was a terrorist training camp.

The United States has made Alispahic's removal from his post and the shutdown of his agency one of the conditions for starting a multi-million dollar program to equip and train Bosnia's army.

Alispahic is a serious "bump in the road" in the process of implementing peace in Bosnia, according to U.S. officials, some of whom consider his continued presence in the Bosnian administration a sign if Iran's growing influence in Bosnia.

"It is a tragicomedy that a big and serious country like the United States makes so much noise out of this," Alispahic said, adding that U.S. concerns were "very silly" and the raid on the training center "in bad taste."

B-H: Commentary Urges Silajdzic To Enter Political Scene

AU1403153796 Sarajevo VECERNJE NOVINE (European edition) in Serbo-Croatian 11 Mar 96 p 4

[Commentary by Deno Novo: "Silajdzic Has Gone Too Far With the Prelude"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Haris Silajdzic is just missing the ideal time to promote his new (still unnamed) party. Since he has probably not managed to find his own bearings in the unprecedented media campaign, in which all the relevant media have opened their doors to him, and since he has very probably broken the world record for the number of interviews that he gave in one month, the former Bosnian prime minister has opened for himself space and time for the creation of a new political party on the territory of the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which would certainly, to judge from the current publicity, be completely equal to the current ruling parties at the start.

Owing to Alija Izetbegovic's (prolonged?) absence from the political scene, an enormous empty space "for work with the masses" has appeared (as God's providence) to Haris Silajdzic. Alija Izetbegovic's illness has, on the other hand, deprived the leading party of its leader (it is fortunate that Bosnia does not need a sovereign until the end of this year, as this sovereign now appears in the person of Leighton Smith). The interim periods, the first one until the elections, and the second one until the departure of IFOR [Implementation Force], have been given to all the political parties to fight for their place under the sun until the beginning of 1997. The SDA's [Party of Democratic Action] main and the only preelection move will be to persuade the Bosniaks to take part in the elections, hoping that that fear will force them to vote for their compatriots. The political program is Dayton 95, economic projects do not exist, the plan for national development is being presented in a series of two or three phrases, factional irreconciliation has been reduced to personal clashes and not to differences in substance. Alija Izetbegovic, and this has never been a secret, has managed to absorb the rifts, and is using the power of his personality to fill the cavities that the SDA (as a movement) has made.

Haris Silajdzic, if he wants to remain in political life, must not wait a day longer. Apart from presenting the

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working name of his party and hinting at setting up branches in the Tuzla region, he has not done anything else. His everyday appearance in the media, in which he only refers to past events (of which he is a part himself), cannot lead to a breakthrough. Everything is reminiscent of the second half of the 1980's, when the public was waiting for Zdarvko Grebo to speak up. The end of the 20th century can easily pass by while people wait for Haris Silajdzic to speak up.

B-H: Zubak Hopeful Muslim Decisions on Sarajevo To Change

LD1303212196 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 13 Mar 96

[Telephone interview with Kresimir Zubak, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation in Sarajevo, by Sasa Kopljar in Zagreb—live]

[FBIS Translated Text] We have a linkup with Kresimir Zubak, president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in Sarajevo. Good evening Mr. Zubak.

[Zubak] Good evening.

[Kopljar] Thank you for responding to our invitation. The crisis in connection with the setting up of Sarajevo authorities is continuing. There is a real danger that it might threaten the functioning of the entire Federation. Tell us who is against the federation and how serious is the crisis that is rocking it?

[Zubak] You have posed a few questions. I will try to be as simple and brief as possible in my reply to your questions.

Whenever we have to put into practice what we accepted in our Constitution, other regulations and agreements, we are faced with huge problems. The same situation has arisen again: When we have to put into practice the part of the Rome agreement regarding the establishment of the police force in municipalities around Sarajevo, and when we have to set up a canton on the territory of Sarajevo, serious problems and differences between the political partners are emerging .

I have already said on previous occasions, and I still believe, that the fundamental difference and problems lie in the fact that we have not yet coordinated our views on what the federation should be like.

[Kopljar] Can we say now what will happen in the future. Can a compromise solution on Sarajevo be found, or on other open issues, or will some sort of international arbitration be necessary?

[Zubak] I had talks with Mr. Ganic today and I believe that we shall change the current decision relating to Sarajevo, i.e., that we shall reach a final solution regarding its political and legal setup. I am likewise convinced that what is happening in connection with the setting up of the police force in Sarajevo will be regulated finally in accordance with what we agreed in Rome and what is envisaged by the federal law on internal affairs.

[Kopljar] Mr. Zubak, thank you very much.

B-H: Sarajevo Called 'New Neuralgic Spot' in Federation

LD1303172196 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1351 GMT 13 Mar 96

["Pool" item by Zdravko Milanovic]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Mar. 13 (TANJUG)—It is becoming certain that after Mostar, confict has been resumed in Sarajevo, the new neuralgic spot in the unstable Muslim-Croat Federation.

The binational federation was formed in Mar. 1994 under pressure from the United States, after a year of fierce fighting between the Muslims and Croats, but has never gotten off the ground.

The federal partners are at discord again, after a unilateral decision by the Muslim Party of Democratic Action (SDA) to constitute Sarajevo as a new one-national (Muslim) canton.

The SDA, supported by two opposition Muslims parties, late on Monday outvoted the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) in the Sarajevo parliament, the Croats observing dumbfounded how their 'equal federal partners' envisage the federation.

The HDZ presidency issued a statement 'decisively protesting the illegal and unconstitutional constituting of the city of Sarajevo as a one-national canton.'

'In this manner, SDA has confirmed in practice that a federation is not its aim, but a means to its aim (unitary Bosnia),' said the statement.

Muslim Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic said in a response to the demand for equality by the Sarajevo Croats, 'I am not sure what is being demanded. If it's parity, then the demand is unacceptable.'

President of the Federation Kresimir Zubak (Croat) warned the Muslims that the 'attempt to impose upon the Croats the status of minority and second-class citizens will destroy the federation.'

'If one thinks about a federation in the manner suitable to his ethnic group, then he must know that he is thereby signing its death sentence,' said Zubak.

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The Croats said they would inform the world public about this and an incident that occurred on Tuesday in the Serb Sarajevo suburb Ilidza, now in the control of the Muslim-Croat Federation, when Muslims returned to Kiseljak nine Croat policemen for refusing to wear the green uniform of the Muslim police.

Sarajevo Croats have threatened exodus from Sarajevo, encouraged by the Muslims with mass lay-offs, Croatian media report.

The gap between the federal partners is widening, western media say, adding it was apparent the Federation was in trouble.

The next war in Bosnia could be one between the Muslims and Croats, a European diplomat told the LOS ANGELES TIMES last week.

B-H: Muslims Reportedly Ignore Agreement on Federal Police

LD1503114196 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1048 GMT 15 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Mar. 15 (TANJUG)—Muslim-Croat Federation Deputy Interior Minister Jozo Leutar (Croat) said late on Thursday that the Muslims had turned a deaf ear to accords reached with the Croats on organizing police in Sarajevo suburbs, said Croatian radio.

The radio said the agreement had been made between the federation's president and vice-president, Kresimir Zubak (Croat) and Ejup Ganic (Muslim).

A statement issued by Zubak's cabinet said that police forces that entered the abandoned Serb Sarajevo suburbs of Vogosca, Ilijas, Hadzici and Ilidza could not be considered federal units as they had not been organized in keeping with the law on interior affairs of the Muslim-Croat federation.

It said federal police forces could not be held accountable for many criminal offenses and pressures on Serbs who had remained in the former Serb-held suburbs.

B-H: Soljic Not Optimistic About Ankara Conference

LD1403184996 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosnia in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 14 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] A conference of donor states on the arming of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina army begins in Ankara tomorrow. Under the motto "Equip and Train" and under U.S. and Turkish sponsorship, the conference will determine the amount of financial and other aid for the federal army. Should we expect lavish sums of money from this conference? We asked Vladimir Soljic, defense minister of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, how the funds would be distributed and whether the fact that Arab mercenaries are still present in the federation would have any influence on the earmarked resources. These are his answers:

[Begin Soljic recording] Millions of dollars have been mentioned, but I believe, unfortunately.... [pauses] It is embarrassing that often I have to state unpleasant truths, but it is better that people learn them in time.

Personally, I am not an optimist and neither do I expect large funds for the federal army or for Bosnia-Herzegovina, in general. The West and all those who have the money have no mercy. If they had mercy they would probably have no money. [passage omitted]

There is no doubt that America will not help pseudodemocratic regimes, or military regimes, or regimes backed by forces which cannot be called democratic. The condition set by Americans—and America is the only world power today—is that this region is free of all foreign powers, all foreign armies, in particular those inclined to terrorism and methods based on the ideologies which are unsuitable for democratic societies. You know what I mean. I would not wish to talk about something I cannot back with enough information. There is some information, but I always try to discuss issues about which I am completely informed.

So America.... [pauses] There will not be two kinds of aid. The aid will come from democratic countries, including USA, Turkey, and many other countries—so this is not a division on the basis of the religion, but ideology, democracy—the aid cannot come from two different sources. [end recording]

B-H: Federation Goals for Croats, Bosniaks Viewed

AU1503161096 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 11 Mar 96 p 5

[Commentary by Mario Marusic: "Federation—Transitory Station"]

[FBIS Translated Text] While to us the Federation is an objective, to them it is a means to achieving another political objective. Kresimir Zubak, president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, said this, among other things, at the session of the House of Representatives of the HR [Croat Republic] of Herzeg-Bosnia, in his estimation of the present political point in Croat-Bosniak relations and (non)implementation of the Federation.

There. It is easy to notice that President Zubak did not beat around the bush at all, or wrap things in diplomatic cellophane, but went right into the middle

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of things, probably aware of the fact that, if Sarajevo continues such behavior, the whole process could slide into collapse.

President Zubak has also pointed out that some things concerning the Croat-Bosniak Federation have really (still) not moved from a standstill. That is to say that on the Bosniak side, unfortunately, even today some thoughts prevail that the Federation is but a "transitory station," and that the Croat and Bosniak stands on many questions reveal essential differences, expressed in drastic divisions of opinion, about the objective (to the one side) and only the means (to the other).

Zubak warned that neither the numerous agreements we have signed, nor the significant personnel shifts with our partner, particularly in the authority structures, have essentially changed their (Bosniak) position toward the Federation project.

And insisting on the very thing, logically enough, brings into question the implementation of the entire project, on which not only the Croats and Bosniaks, but also the whole international community swears by: that the Federation is (at the moment?) the only way of overwhelming the crisis here.

The institutional and personnel division of the governments of the Republic and the Federation has been, true, a big step in overwhelming the dispute between the federal partners, and precisely when it seemed that the Bosniak side had (nevertheless) agreed to parallel processes in the transfer of authority to the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina organs, Sarajevo—by founding and organizing utterly new organs, like the quasi-governmental Agency for Investigation and Documentation (AID), by the exclusiveness of the federal police, by the creation of an SDA canton in Sarajevo, and so on—has once again shown that it does not want to give up, just like that, on the political objectives, drawn up a long time ago (even at the cost of the other side, the federal partner), according to which the Federation is only the means, and not the objective.

In all that, Sarajevo does not shrink from anything, not even from the unconstitutional extension of the jurisdiction of republican authorities at the expense of the federal ones, or even the more-or-less open pressures on (the rest of) the Croatian population in the territory controlled by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army.

A consistent part of Sarajevo's tactics in all this is also closer and closer cooperation with Iran and other Islamic countries, whose policy is not marked by Muslim approximation to Europe and the West (as should be implemented with the Bosnian Muslims, according to many agreements), but with open opposition to the values of the Old Continent and the United States, in which everything, often even terrorist actions, can be used.

The discovery of several terrorist training centers in Bosnia-Herzegovina, directed with a mujahidin baton, and the constant intimidation of the Croat population, show that such an attitude, unfortunately, is a constituent part of the policy of part of the Sarajevo leadership. This could have fatal consequences for the Federation (about which Washington has already harshly warned the Bosnian Muslims).

Such warnings from the West, and the pressure on Izetbegovic to implement the signed agreements consistently, leave little room for the Bosniak opponents to the Federation. However, as President Zubak has also emphasized, after a series of recent events (we have already mentioned them here) one can draw the conclusion that the Bosniak side has not yet redefined the concept of a so-called democratic and civic Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The expiration of the Dayton agreement deadlines will, however, very soon bring the advocates of such a concept to the moment when they will have to make an "either-or" decision. The more the process of the Federation's construction develops, the clearer their definite decision will be. One can thus expect various nervous reactions from Sarajevo authorities, and attempts to "assign" tutors or supervisors to the common (?) Federation in the shape of noninstitutional agencies, centers, and organizations manned exclusively by Bosniak personnel.

Despite everything, the present moment in Croat-Bosniak relations demands, primarily, that the Croat side refrain from too rash reactions (despite Bosniak antifederal moves)—that is, it demands that the Croat side make politically considered moves, and provide new and concrete evidence of its political will to build the Federation.

This should be done, of course, in such a way that it does "not jeopardize one's own capabilities and possibilities of reacting to all the other possible variants in the resolution of relations in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and in the wider sense," as President Zubak has also clearly pointed out.

B-H: Iranian Official on Value of Humanitarian Aid

AU1403175096 Hanau NOVA BOSNA in Serbo-Croatian 13 Mar 96 p 9

[ONASA report: "Priorities Are Employment and Return of Refugees"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 12 Mar—Residjan Reza [name as published], government official of the

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Islamic Republic of Iran in charge of humanitarian aid, has stated that during the aggression on Bosnia-Herzegovina, his country sent humanitarian aid worth 15 million German marks.

"At the very beginning of the aggression on Bosnia-Herzegovina, we opened our offices in Mostar, Zenica, Bihac, Visoko, and Sarajevo to help all the affected regions equally. We also had an office in Tuzla, but it was closed because of the difficulties in communication with the region," Reza said. According to him, cooperation between Iranian officials and the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina is excellent. "We are aware of the priority needs. We have spoken to UNHCR about the continuation of our cooperation, primarily regarding the biggest problems in Bosnia at present, employment, and the return of refugees," Reza said.

B-H: UNHCR To Reduce Aid Program in Apr

AU1503153196 Paris AFP in English 1453 GMT 15 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Geneva, March 15 (AFP)—The main UN refugee agency will start reducing aid to Bosnia from April, four months after the Bosnian peace treaty was signed last December, a UN official said Friday [15 March].

The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the lead humanitarian aid agency in Bosnia, said the resumption of commercial transport of food and other materials into Bosnia meant the agency could start reducing its aid programme for the country.

In four years since war broke out in Bosnia, the agency distributed more than one million tonnes [metric tons] of food and medicine, UNHCR spokesman Ron Redmond said, mostly by land convoy.

Part of the aid was distributed by the world's longest-working humanitarian air bridge into the capital Sarajevo. That operation stopped earlier this year.

B-H: UN Officials Meet With Serbs on Reconstruction

LD1303175696 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1500 GMT 13 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Sarajevo, 13 Mar (SRNA)—Government officials of the Serb Republic today in Pale had talks with a UNDP [UN Development Program] delegation headed by Josephus van Arendonk. The talks covered UNDP assistance over the next four years.

According to van Arendonk, the UNDP is an organization that helps with projects in health service, education, and industry that can be put into practice immediately or within three to four months.

Dr. Aleksa Buha, the Serb Republic's minister of foreign affairs, said that the Serb Republic's immediate priority is its independence and equality with the Bosnia-Herzegovina federation. He warned that in the aftermath of the Dayton Agreement, the international community was observing neither the Serb Republic's independence nor its equality, especially in the financial sector, since out of $5 billion earmarked for the reconstruction of former Bosnia-Herzegovina, only $1.4 billion was allocated to the Serb Republic.

"The international community has the money to arm the Muslim army at the time when disarmament negotiations are in progress in Vienna but it apparently has no money for the reconstruction of the Serb Republic," Buha said. He warned that such development would lead to a new tragedy rather than to reconstruction. [passage omitted]

Health Minister Kalinic explained that the Serb Republic needed 150 million German marks for the repair of health facilities destroyed in the war. Jobs must also be found for a large number of doctors, especially those who fled Sarajevo.

Speaking about the social situation in the Serb Republic, Kalinic said that the majority of about 600,000 refugees and displaced persons were living in refugee centers and should be transferred into individual housing as soon as possible and be given building material for the repair of houses and buildings.

He warned that the difficult position of senior citizens, the unemployed, the families of soldiers killed in the war, children, and invalids could result in discontent and be a constant source of instability.

Slavisa Rakovic, the Serb Republic president's economic adviser, asked for support for the privatization process and the development of small and medium businesses in the Serb Republic and suggested the formation of a management center.

"Two out of five geographic areas in the Serb Republic are underdeveloped and they would be right for small agriculture based programs," Rakovic said.

According to Serb Republic Transport Minister Nedeljko Laic, the Serb Republic has telecommunications, railway, and roads but no air, river, or sea transport.

"In its air raids last year NATO destroyed our radio transmitter centers and the road network, especially bridges," Minister Laic said.

He said that the most pressing task for IFOR [Implementation Force] is to clear the rubble from the river

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Drina to avoid large-scale flooding. He also appealed for help in rebuilding bridges and damaged roads.

Over the next two days the UNDP delegation will continue talks with relevant ministers on the ways of providing help to the Serb Republic.

B-H: UN Official Stresses Need for Reconstruction Funds

AU1403184896 Paris AFP in English 1646 GMT 14 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tuzla, Bosnia-Herzegovina, March 14 (AFP)—A senior official overseeing civilian aspects of Bosnia's Dayton peace accord lambasted the international community Thursday [14 March] for not living up to pledges of aid to rebuild Bosnia.

Michael Steiner, deputy to UN High Representative Carl Bildt, said reconstruction in Bosnia was running behind schedule because the money needed by Bosnia and promised by the international community had not arrived.

Speaking after meetings with Bosnian and Serb mayors in northeastern Bosnia, he admitted "serious shortcomings" in implementing civilian aspects of the Dayton accord.

And he warned of a "time bomb" waiting to explode in the northern town of Brcko if the future of the town—which has seen a recent influx of thousands of Serbs from Sarajevo—was not settled soon.

"We're late (on reconstruction) because the money is not coming. There was a plan, there was a donors' conference, but it does not translate into real action on the ground.

"The real problem is we do not have the money that was promised in the beginning. It does not help us if we have investment next year or in two years, we need it now. We need visible signs that peace pays," said Steiner, a German diplomat with several years' experience in Bosnia

A donors' conference will be held in Sarajevo on Saturday, he said, to be followed by a major conference organised in Brussels by the World Bank on April 12 and 13.

"If by then we do not have clear signs that at least for this year the amounts necessary are available, despite all the military success it will be difficult to persuade people that peace really pays," Steiner said.

Steiner met Wednesday and Thursday with the mayors of the Serb-held towns of Brcko, Bijeljina and Zvornik as well as the Moslem mayor of Tuzla.

He also met 129 Serb prisoners detained in Tuzla who under the Dayton accord should have been released in January, and a delegation of women from the former Moslem-held enclave of Srebrenica seized by Bosnian Serb forces in July last year.

B-H: UN Police To Double Strength in Tuzla Region

AU1503095196 Paris AFP in English 0939 GMT 15 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tuzla, Bosnia-Herzegovina, March 15 (AFP)—The UN police force in Bosnia's northeast Tuzla region is to be more than doubled in strength by the end of the month, a UN official said Friday.

Around 160 officers are due to join the UN-run International Police Task Force (IPTF) in the area over the next two weeks to join just over 100 already there, UN Tuzla spokesman Bruce Stock said.

Overall strength for Tuzla should eventually reach 463, he added—some 100 more than previously planned. The contingent should be at full strength by the end of May, he said.

"It's a recognition that the area is very large and complex because of the percentage of it that is under Serb control," Stock said.

"The numbers are being increased because the various countries supplying them are now having them come through at a better rate than before," he added.

Among the new arrivals due shortly are 10 U.S. policemen. Some 13 U.S. cops arrived Thursday to work with the UN police force in the Bosnian capital Sarajevo.

The police's mandate runs to monitoring and training local police forces, but does not extend to carrying out normal policing duties.

Based in Tuzla, the northeast force has offices in the Serb-held towns of Bijeljina, Bratunac, Doboj and Zvornik, and the Moslem-Croat towns of Srebrenik, Vares, Zenica and Zivinice.

It hopes eventually to have a total of 30 to 40 local offices.

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B-H: EU Officials: Reconciliation Efforts in Mostar Fail

AU1403122196 Paris AFP in English 1128 GMT 14 Mar 96

[By Michel Carriou]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina, March 14 (AFP)—More than 20 months of efforts by the European Union to reconcile the divided Moslems and Croats of this southern Bosnian town have failed utterly, EU and aid officials told AFP here Thursday [14 March].

The efforts have been beaten by bitterness and suspicion and plagued by fear between the two communities, they said.

"Every day that passes without some sort of an incident is just that, but no more. It has not built up any reserves of confidence," said one long-serving member of the European Union adminsitration, who declined to be named.

"There is no confidence," between Moslems and Croats, he added.

The Europeans set up their interim administration in Mostar in July 1994, a few months after the end of 11 months of bitter and bloody fighting pitting Moslems against Croats.

It was, EU officials here say, primarily a "human challenge"—to get people who had been fighting each other for months to live again in the same city, on the same streets and in the same apartment blocks.

But so far, the Croats still live almost exclusively on the west bank of the city. And the Moslems still live on the east bank.

The EU has extended its administration mandate up to the end of this year but few in the administration are optimistic.

"People are tired of war, of course, apart from the extremists. But they would find it difficult to live together. It is easy to see why," a European policeman said.

Mostar, a once beautiful town surrounded by the Herzegovina hills, is one of the key cities of the Moslem-Croat federation, set up under pressure from Washington in 1994 as one of the two components of the Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina.

The other is the Srpska Republika of the the rebel Serbs.

Since a Bosnia conference in Rome in February, changes have been made in the town, most notably the formal introduction of freedom of movement between the two halves of the town.

On the war-battered east side, work has begun to restore water, and electricity services and telephone lines work better than before. Farming has resumed for the first time in four years in the hills behind the town.

An official with the peace Implementation Force is still not hopeful however.

"The look of the town is changing but nothing in their heads is any different," he still, refusing to be named.

Despite promises to allow Moslems to pass freely through Croat areas and Croats through Moslem areas, police and milita groups still have road blocks throughout the town.

Cars do not venture from one side to the other and people fear to be seen in one side reading a newspaper from the other side. Each community watches its television and listens to its radio.

In Moslem east Mostar, people pay in Bosnian dinars. In Croat west Mostar, they pay in Croatian kunas.

Though joint Moslem-Croat police patrols have taken place, the joint police force planned for March 1 has yet to be created.

"You can do all you can," said Julio Melon, an aid official with the Spanish branch of the Medecins du Monde medical charity. "But if they do not want to live together, we can't force them."

B-H: IFOR Commander: Bosnian Peace Process in Question

LD1303113596 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1026 GMT 13 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Mar 12 (TANJUG)—IFOR [Implementation Force] Commander Admiral Leighton Smith said Tuesday [12 March] in Sarajevo that the implementation of the mission in Bosnia in the military sphere was proceeding well, but that the peace process was still in question due to local political disputes and insufficient funds.

Difficulties in raising funds for Bosnia's economic recovery are the greatest hindrance to peace, Smith said quoted by REUTERS.

Smith said Bosnian Serbs had so far refused to name new political and military leaders, thus complicating the process of creating post-war institutions in Bosnia.

He also said that Muslim-Croat Federation was in difficulties because Muslim and Croat leaders are unable

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to agree on the division of power in the two most important cities—Sarajevo and Mostar.

B-H: IFOR's Reluctance To Use Force Criticized

AU1303154496 Sarajevo VECERNJE NOVINE (European edition) in Serbo-Croatian 12 Mar 96 p 3

[Commentary by Ada Campara: "Messing Around With Brcko"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Instead of concentrating on separating the warring parties and linking the separated entities, the Implementation Force's [IFOR] General Staff is silently observing the arson and pillage of property around Sarajevo. The motives of the arsonists are understandable, as the ashes will conceal the evidence of the robbery and crime for which they would eventually end up in court.

IFOR initiated in a big way the wayward ways of the Dayton agreement by silently observing the ethnic cleansing of the already occupied territories—there can be no other interpretation of the forced settlement of Serbs in Brcko, Bratunac, Zvornik, and Foca—and it has made two great mistakes during its mandate. First, it did not use force in cases of property being destroyed and, second, it did not defend with force the actual situation on the ground after the signing of the peace agreement. Having freedom of movement throughout the territory, as the only military force authorized to have this, IFOR is particularly guilty over the future of Brcko, particularly the fate of the forthcoming arbitration. Its forces did not prevent the ethnic "cementing" of the entity, with which they have already prevented democratic and fair elections, as stipulated by the Dayton agreement.

Instead of hunting down the arsonists, IFOR is using its guns to protect the firemen. Thus, the policy of neutrally observing the Bosnian drama continues and is about to move into its third act. To judge from the actual situation on the ground, we can expect criminals to be elected to the Serb entity's legitimate bodies of authority. If people settled on other people's property through mass migrations in full view of Admiral Smith, the same people will probably have a much easier task of "forcing"—before Bildt's very eyes—people to participate in elections according to the criteria set by the Serb Democratic Party.

However, our officials' complaints and condemnation of the generals for not preventing the establishment of a new situation on the ground have not motivated NATO to prevent this. Another logical question presents itself in view of the latest political games around Sarajevo and Brcko: Does the peace agreement have mechanisms to force the implementation of what has been signed? To judge from what the generals and the official representatives of Dayton witnesses are not doing and from the issues that our legal and legitimate authorities are not addressing, it seems that everything is being conducted in a clandestine manner. Private political connections and convincing statements about the foreigners' good intentions could turn into a nightmare with painful, long-term hangovers.

B-H: British IFOR Considering HQ Move to Banja Luka

AU1503150196 Paris AFP in English 1429 GMT 15 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Banja Luka, Bosnia-Herzegovina, March 15 (AFP)—The NATO-led peace Implementation Force (IFOR) is considering moving the headquarters of the 13,000-strong British IFOR contingent to the largest Serb-held town in Bosnia, a senior IFOR commander said here Friday [15 March].

British General Michael Walker, commander of IFOR ground troops, said he had discussed with the Serb mayor of Banja Luka "a number of things including the possible move of General (Michael) Jackson's headquarters to Banja Luka."

Jackson is the commander of the 13,000 British troops currently headquartered in Gornji Vakuf, central Bosnia.

Walker was speaking after a meeting with the Serb mayor Predrag Radic.

B-H: Serb, IFOR Officials Discuss Dayton Implementation

LD1503173496 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1524 GMT 15 Mar 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Banja Luka, March 15 (TANJUG)—The Mayor of Banja Luka, a city in the north of the Republika Srpska (RS), Predrag Radic, and the Commander of IFOR [Implementation Force] Ground Forces, Michael Walker, discussed Friday the implementaion of the peace agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina.

General Walker told journalists after meeting with Radic, that the talks dealt with concrete issues of general interest, as the restoration of electric power, the free movement of people, and the possibility of reopening aeronautical clubs.

He added that they examined the possibility of transfering the command of the sector south-west of IFOR,

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whose commander is British General Mike Jackson, to Banja Luka, the biggest city in RS.

B-H: Bildt Calls For Increasing IFOR Tasks in Bosnia

LD1303220696 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1724 GMT 13 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Brussels, March 13 (TANJUG)—International Community's High Representative for Bosnia Carl Bildt, who is in charge of the civilian aspect of the Bosnia peace agreement, on Wednesday [13 March] called for an increased engagement of the Bosnia Implementation Force (IFOR) on civilian affairs.

Bildt was a guest at a regular session of the NATO Council in Brussels, dedicated to the current situation in Bosnia and IFOR's role.

He pointed at the need of IFOR's greater engagement, especially in the latest events in Sarajevo, where incidents, such as fires and destruction of facilities which will have to be reconstructed, took place after the majority of Serb population had moved out.

Therefore, Bildt called for IFOR's direct engagement on the tasks of civilian police in these sections of Sarajevo.

The NATO headquarters issued a special statement, expressing deep concern over fires, lootings and other criminal activities in parts of Sarajevo which are to be placed under the federal control.

The IFOR command and NATO Council fully support Bildt's efforts and promise assistance in preventing these incidents.

Spokesman for the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees Kris Janowski said in Sarajevo on Tuesday [12 March] that (Muslim) looters intimidated the remaining Serbs in Sarajevo and that 'people (Serbs) who had to scrape up all their courage to stay are now being victimized.'

Muslims in the Sarajevo suburb of Ilidza, which was on Tuesday handed over to the Muslim-Croat federation in keeping with the Dayton peace agreement, loot Serb houses and intimidate the remaining Serbs, U.N. Spokesman in Sarajevo Aleksandr Ivanko said late on Tuesday.

According to U.N. estimates, barely 2,000 out of 26,000 Serbs remained in Ilidza. Thousands of Muslims flocked into Ilidza after the Serb police withdrew.

B-H: UN Spokesman Criticizes Police Conduct in Ilidza

AU1503153696 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 15 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The United Nations continues to receive complaints about threats, theft of property, and looting from Serbs living in the Sarajevo suburb of Ilidza. This was stated at an IFOR [Implementation Force] news conference in Sarajevo today. UN spokesman Alexander Ivanko has stated that the authorities of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina have not done anything to prevent this in the area.

Two members of the Federation police were seen laughing at threats being directed at a Serb to leave his house, Ivanko said, adding that the United Nations knows the names of these policemen and that it will demand their removal from duty.

There are currently 90 Federation police in Ilidza. They were appointed by the international police. Considering that the number of policemen is insufficient to stop these incidents, another 30 policemen will be sent to Ilidza tomorrow.

B-H: Ilidza Police Chief on Foreign Media 'Misinformation'

AU1403211396 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 14 Mar 96

[Interview with Ilidza police chief Enver Dupovac by Lejla Tafro in Sarajevo on 14 March—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Dupovac] I can say that, as far as criminal groups are concerned, organized criminal groups, we have so far not registered a single organized group. True, there are individual cases and we have been combating them quite effectively. We have been fighting these individual cases rather effectively. However, I have to stress that this force of 90 policemen is not sufficient to cover such a vast area and last night we asked for the number to be increased. Today we received approval to increase the number by 30 policemen, who will naturally reflect the ethnic structure of the district.

As for individual cases of, let us call them looting, crime and so on, there is a lot of misinformation by the foreign media. In most of these cases, it is Ilidza citizens that come to see their apartments and then take some things with them as memorabilia or to try to protect them and so on. However, they are portrayed as people that have come to loot. There has been a bit of a misunderstanding there. I have to say that there have also been many false reports. Yesterday alone, we had 61 report on criminal activities, on looting and so on, but when we investigated on the scene with the representatives of the

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international police, we registered only three cases of petty theft.

[Tafro] As the first man in the Ilidza police, can you guarantee the security of all the citizens in this area?

[Dupovac] I guarantee them full security. I would like to convey to the citizens of Ilidza that the establishment of the Federation authorities guarantees them full freedom of movement and full personal and property security for all the citizens of Ilidza. In this context I have to tell you that we have already had some cases in which Ilidza citizens came to us and congratulated us on such work. We have surprised them with our attitude toward them, toward their property and security. I mean this in the positive sense.

B-H: Remaining Vogosca Serbs Demand More Protection

AU1403202096 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 14 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Although satisfied by the correct and professional behavior of the members of the federation police in the district of Vogosca, the citizens of Serb nationality that remained to live there believe that more effectiveness is needed for the protection of their lives and property.

A group of citizens of Serb nationality from Vogosca informed Mirko Pejanovic, state presidency member and chairman of the Serb Civic Council, about this demand at today's meeting in the Vogosca commune building.

The safety of the citizens of Serb nationality, their property, and their right to freedom of movement has been endangered by frequent robberies, threats, and incorrect behavior by individuals. It was said that such behavior did not come from the local Bosniak and Croat people—that is, from former neighbors but from people who were robbing and maltreating the citizens. It was promised today that the members of the federation police, particularly after 20 March when their number will be increased in Vogosca, would offer more effective protection. [passage omitted]

B-H: Official Warns Grbavica Returnees of 'Booby Traps'

AU1403195996 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 14 Mar 96

[Report by Sanda Grkic]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Grkic] At the meeting between citizens of Grbavica, Kovacici, and Vrace, and Atif Delic, Grbavica district chief, Ibrahim Bakic, chairman of the association of Grbavica citizens, and Safet Cutuk, Novo Sarajevo police chief, the most important information was presented for the entry into this area on 19 March.

It was said that the entry would be organized via the Brotherhood and Unity Bridge only after the federation police and the civilian authorities had entered. The first to enter this district will be the workers of the bakery, dairy, and the tobacco factory, and the humanitarian organizations of the Red Cross, who will distribute clothes and footwear, and sleeping bags, and Merhamet, who will distribute 100 emergency packages as temporary aid for people that decide to remain in the area. Full medical coverage will be provided for all the citizens. Nothing will be left to chance.

The dynamics of return will be carried out in accordance with the already made list of only those people who lived in these areas before the war. So far approximately 2,000 people have applied. After the countersabotage units check out the communes, the plan is to allow every day 50 people to enter the district. The settling will be done in accordance with a schedule: Grbavica II, Grbavica I, Kovacici, Gornji Kovacici, and Vrace. The refugee carton or identification papers will be used as proof at entry point. All those who try to steal or do any damage will be prosecuted in accordance with the law and given a 10 year prison sentence.

The citizens of these district were addressed by Safet Cutuk, Novo Sarajevo police chief, who gave them some useful tips regarding entry.

[Cutuk] Before you enter, we have organized our teams to check out all your homes and business premises, who had them there, so that you are safe, so that, God forbid, something should happen to you now after you have survived all this.

The apartments contain booby traps. We have confirmed information about that. When you enter the apartments, you will find a great number of fire extinguishers. They have been booby-trapped. This is 100-percent correct information. Do not touch these things; do not touch anything you find, not even a pencil. It might appear okay to you, but there are such explosive devices. They attract the attention of the person and then simply explode. Whatever you find, no matter how interesting, do not touch it, please. Inform the police and they will be there first. We are here to help you.

Let me also tell you that on that first day, no one but us Grbavica citizens will be allowed to enter, regardless of whether this causes dissatisfaction among some citizens. Our aim is to prevent looting of the things that are left behind. [passage omitted]

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B-H: Serbs To Allow Brcko Expellees To Visit Homes

AU1403201496 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 14 Mar 96

[Report by Amir Kadric from the Brcko area]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Lieutenant Colonel (?Tony Kukolo), commander of the Implementation Force [IFOR] in this region, chaired separate meetings with two delegations at his headquarters in the zone of separation: One delegation was from the Association of Brcko citizens-returnees and the other from the Serb entity.

After the delegation of Brcko citizens-returnees presented (?Kukolo) with written demands that were agreed upon at the previous meeting—and here we single out the organized bus tour of the city, the visit to the cemetery, personal contacts with family and friends that live in Brcko, and a return to their city in order to protect it from destruction—the IFOR commander asked them to leave so that he could, as he said, present the Serb side with their demands and hear their views on them.

After an hour and a half with the Serb side, which immediately departed following the talks, the lieutenant colonel called in the delegation of the Brcko citizens and explained to them in a matter of minutes that he had managed to reach an agreement with the Serbs that one busload of expelled Brcko citizens—after the administrative formalities are dealt with—could visit their city with the provision that the route through the city and any stops made had to be exactly determined.

The Serb side also agreed to cemetary visits, but only for two hours on Fridays.

Lieutenant Colonel (?Kukolo) stressed that the schedule for the realization of both these demands would be worked out later. [passage omitted]

B-H: Serb Official Sees Dayton as 'Injustice' to Serbs

AU1403183096 Banja Luka Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1930 GMT 13 Mar 96

[Statements by Bosnian Serb officials Nedjeljko Prstojevic and Dusan Sehovac; place and date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Prstojevic] The Dayton accord did an injustice to the Serb people. The fact that the Serbs were not given a special status in the talks after the Dayton agreement led to the ethnic cleansing of the Serbs. I hope that it is only temporary and that the Serb Republic's state leadership and the entire Serb nation will have the wisdom and the strength to use political and diplomatic means to win a special status for the Serbs in this area and their property.

[Dusan Sehovac] We want a chance to keep the Serb authorities on our territory until 20 March, as was specified by the Dayton accord. In that we hope to be supported by the world, by the Muslim side and to come to an agreement, through fair and democratic dialogue, on what the authorities will look like in the Federation after 20 March.

B-H: Serb Official: Fewer Than 1% of Serbs Remain in Sarajevo

LD1403175596 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1524 GMT 14 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Pale, 14 Mar (TANJUG)—Gojko Klickovic, the president of the [Bosnian Serb] government headquarters for the reception and accommodation of the population of Serb Sarajevo, said in Pale today that the task of evacuating Serbs from the parts of the city that have been handed over to the Muslim-Croat Federation is drawing to a close, and that fewer than one percent of Serbs remain in Sarajevo.

Klickovic said at a news conference that it was a tragedy that a people who had withstood 36 offensives, was in the end moving away toward the center of the Serb Republic because of a decision made at the negotiating table.

He said that 40,000 people had moved to the outlying districts of Sarajevo (Dobrinja, Kasindol, Vojkovici, Lukavica) that have remained in the Serb Republic, 45,000 were temporarily accommodated in the Sarajevo Romanija mountains, and the remaining 50,000 have been settled in municipalities from Brcko to Trebinje.

Commenting on the incidents occurring in the municipalities of Serb Sarajevo where the transfer of authority has taken place, Klickovic said that this was the best evidence that the international community has not guaranteed their security if they remain.

After 19 March, by which date the population of Grbavica will be evacuated, the headquarters will continue its work in taking care of the refugee Sarajevo citizens throughout the Serb Republic, Klickovic said.

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B-H: Karadzic Accused of Undermining Serb Army Command

AU1403174596 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 13 Mar 96 p 3

[Report by FONET: "Karadzic Tried To 'Undermine' Serb Republic Army Command"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Pale—Milan Gvero, assistant to the commander of the Serb Republic Army Main Headquarters, has accused Radovan Karadzic, president of the Serb Republic, of attempting but failing—as he put it—to undermine the command of the Serb Republic Army, also adding his assessment that the ruling party in the Serb Republic could lose the first postwar elections.

In an interview to correspondents that was yesterday delivered to REUTER, General Gvero accused Karadzic and the civilian leaders in the Serb Republic of making a series of mistakes during the three and a half year war in Bosnia. He criticized Karadzic for trying to forge stronger ties with opposition parties in Serbia while relying on the financial assistance from the Serbian Government. "That is proof of official and political immaturity," General Gvero said.

Gvero said that Karadzic's administration failed to give the armed forces adequate financial assistance, particularly to the wounded and the families of killed fighters. He also accused Karadzic and the ruling Serbian Democratic Party of creating a rift between the civilian police and the army by favoring the police both financially and in the official media. REUTER recalls that a conflict broke out last year between the Serb Republic Army and Karadzic when he tried to oust commander Ratko Mladic, but was forced to back down when the other generals publicly rejected his order.

As for the International War Crimes Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Gvero said that it was "a political institution," and added that indicted General Djordje Djukic, who is in The Hague prison, "is a very honorable, able, and effective man with high moral standards."

B-H: Karadzic Seeking To Oust Gens Gvero, Tolimir

AU1403162896 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 13 Mar 96 p 3

[Report by BETA: "Gvero, Tolimir Ousting Again Sought"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade—Serb Republic President Radovan Karadzic has begun consultations with the military leadership about reorganization and personnel changes in the Serb Republic army. As BETA found out from circles close to the authorities of the Bosnian Serbs, Karadzic is in Banja Luka, where he has been holding meetings with several generals from the military leadership. The same circles claim that, during preliminary consultations about the reorganization of the army, Karadzic again brought up the issue of ousting Generals Milan Gvero and Zdravko Tolimir, which he demanded at the beginning of August last year. The sources say that there have been no concrete proposals or demands in that respect and that all the generals are still in their posts.

B-H: Serbs Claim Sarajevo Suburb 'Occupied' by IFOR

AU1403145496 Banja Luka Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1930 GMT 13 Mar 96

[Report by Jelena Rajakovic by telephone from Pale]

[FBIS Translated Text] Orange posts marking out the authority transfer zone were the first thing that the inhabitants of Dobrinja could see this morning in this part of the city [of Sarajevo]. Despite the talks between commissions of the Serb Republic and the Croat-Muslim federation on the demarcation of disputed territory, which is to be completed by 19 March, this morning in the Sarajevo suburb of Dobrinja, the separation line was marked out by IFOR [Implementation Force] members. Again at the expense of the Serbs, of course. The disputed areas were marked as an interzone, while the separation line was moved several blocks toward the Serb part of Dobrinja. During the day, nobody bothered to give an explanation to the perplexed inhabitants of this part of Sarajevo.

Meanwhile, about 400 Sarajevo Serbs, who have taken a big risk by deciding to stay in their homes under the Federation authorities, are still facing all their problems. They are frequently threatened and bullied by Muslims who came to Ilidza immediately after the transfer of authority. The Serb municipality of Novo Sarajevo, which is to be taken over by the Federation police on 19 March, was today occupied by IFOR and the international police. A protest was lodged with the high command about that and an explanation said it was done allegedly to provide more security for the Serbs. In this part of the city, the evacuation of citizens and their property is drawing to a close and officials believe that every Serb who wants to cross to the Serb Republic will be evacuated before the transfer of authority.

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B-H: Plavsic Comments on Return of Sarajevo Serbs

AU1403143096 Banja Luka Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1930 GMT 13 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Commenting on the evacuation of Sarajevo Serbs, Serb Republic Vice President Biljana Plavsic said today that the hope that the Serbs would return to this city, as planned by the Dayton accord, is totally without basis and stems from poor knowledge of history, from the times of the Ottoman Empire to the present. "It is tragic that more than 90 percent of the people who spent the four years of war in the Sarajevo area had to leave town," stated Biljana Plavsic.

B-H: SGV Writes to Zubak on Sarajevo Organization

AU1303201596 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 13 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Serb Civic Council [SGV] of the City of Sarajevo has today sent a letter to Kresimir Zubak, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, which reads:

You must be aware that the SGV has publicly presented its stand on the organization of the City of Sarajevo. Our view is that the urban part of Sarajevo should be organized as a district. This was also determined by the Washington Agreement and the Federation Constitution.

A canton for the Sarajevo region is a question for itself. The organization of the urban part of the City of Sarajevo is a separate question from those concerning the setting up of cantons.

In the letter, the SGV demands from Kresimir Zubak as president of the Federation to launch an initiative in the Federation Assembly to pass a law on the District of the City of Sarajevo. In this way the citizens of Sarajevo and the peoples who live in it would be enabled to run their city on an equal footing, the SGV states in its letter.

B-H: SGV Says Serbs Want To Return to Sarajevo

AU1303194296 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 13 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Serb Civic Council [SGV] of the City of Sarajevo has today sent a letter to Izudin Kapetanovic, prime minister of the Federation Government, in which it says that the Sarajevo City SGV has assumed an active attitude toward the process of reintegration of the City of Sarajevo. It has been learned from contacts with citizens of Serb nationality who have stayed in Vogosca, Ilijas, Novi Grad, and Ilidza that a number of Serbs want to return to their apartments and houses.

The Sarajevo City CGV proposes some measures that the Federation authorities should take over the return of Serbs who were forced to leave Sarajevo's suburbs. According to the SGV, the government should set up a commission to register all apartments, houses, and property owned by Serbs before the war. The property should be protected for a certain period of time as set down by the government. Citizens of Serb nationality should also be invited to return to their apartments and houses within six months. And, last, a bureau for regulating the rights of refugees and returns should be formed at the Sarajevo city level.

B-H: Krajisnik Warns of Arming Croat-Muslim Federation

LD1203231396 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 2137 GMT 12 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Sarajevo, 12 Mar (SRNA)—Momcilo Krajisnik, speaker of the [Bosnian] Serb assembly, and Istvan Gyarmati, OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] representative for military issues, agreed in Pale this evening that success of the peace mission [in Bosnia-Herzegovina] will depend on equal treatment for the Serb Republic and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

After the meeting, Krajisnik said that he warned the Hungarian diplomat that the international community's intention to arm the army of the Croat-Muslim federation will not contribute to peace.

"We have to prevent such occurrences and intentions if we want to maintain peace in this region," said the speaker, expressing his hope that the cooperation between the Serb Republic and the OSCE in the control and inspection of armaments of both sides will be good.

Krajisnik said that the whole of the Dayton agreement must be implemented because all its parts "constitute a peace plan."

Asked by SRNA to comment on the assessment of the government of the Serb Republic that there are considerable aberrations from the solutions in the Dayton agreement in practice, Krajisnik explained:

"The Dayton agreement envisages a joint civil commission which should solve certain problems in the transitional period. The other side, however, formed the government and we had to say that it had powers only on the territory of the Croat-Muslim federation."

According to Krajisnik, joint institutions will be formed only after elections, "but even then there will be no joint government, only a ministerial committee."

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He repeated the stand of the Serb Republic's leadership that the issues "which were not discussed and agreed upon must not be forced behind the scenes because this cannot lead to a stable peace."

"Every instance of outvoting and imposition leads to a conflict; our aim is to honor the decision regarding such a small number of posts on which we have agreed, not to obstruct things," the speaker of the Serb Republic's assembly said in conclusion. [passage omitted]

B-H: Koljevic Arranges Investment in RS Businesses

AU1403143596 Banja Luka Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1930 GMT 13 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Serb Republic [SR] Vice President Nikola Koljevic stated that businessmen from Austria, France, and Britain are interested in setting up representative offices in the Serb Republic. During the stay in those countries, his hosts expressed willingness to invest capital in projects in the field of high technology, electronics, and agriculture. "In Paris we agreed to create a French-Serb village in the Serb Republic in which small businesses would be opened," stated Serb Republic Vice President Nikola Koljevic.

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Croatia: Krajina Refugees To Return 'Collectively'

AU1403094096 Beli Manastir Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1920 GMT 11 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Public forums are held in all the major Baranja towns, at which the implementation of the Erdut agreement and of the program for the housing and settlement of refugees and displaced persons, and the measures for the revitalization of economic activity, are discussed. The people of Baranja provide constructive solutions for the political struggle aimed at realizing the national interests of the Serb people, as well as specific proposals regarding the basic conditions necessary for successful economic activity and the handling of deviant behavior. Our correspondents attended the public forum in Beli Manastir:

[Unidentified correspondent] The Erdut agreement and the Dayton accord, which were signed last year, the Security Council resolution, and Butrus-Ghali's report provide the conditions for the political struggle we should all join in order to resolve our vital issues. This was stated at yesterday's meeting of refugee and displaced Serbs from western parts of the Krajina who are living in the Baranja area.

Srem and Baranja, as centuries-old Serb territory in which Serbs are in the majority, represent the starting point for the political activity through which pressure must be made on Croatia, through the international community, to observe the rights of the Serbs who used to live, or are still living within its state and legal framework. This is the reason the refugees in Baranja will accept all the forms of cooperation with representatives of international organizations, whose visits to Srem-Baranja Province have recently become frequent.

The UN transitional period and administration do not represent peaceful reintegration, I mean peaceful integration of Baranja and Srem into the framework of the Croatian state, but a period of [words indistinct] of the vital issues, as well as the Serb issue in general.

[Words indistinct] the Croatian media, whose propaganda is still mostly based on lies, the time is now for joint action and the unified position that we want the same rights as the Croat refugees, and that we exercise our right to return or receive compensation for destroyed property. We do not accept any (?separate) laws of the Republic of Croatia on the return of individual Serbs to their homes. We will return collectively, and it will not be only the elderly people, but also the young, who will preserve the nation.

The so-called pilot programs that have lately become subject of much discussion can only be actualized under one condition: If the Croat refugees want to return to Bilje, we want to return to Zadar or some other towns where a large number of Serbs used to live, said Milenko Mustapic, president of the Baranja assembly of the associations of refugees.

The refugees of Baranja do not recognize any reception centers in which (?the Croatian state) would hold them until their problem is resolved, as the representatives of the Croatian authorities have been saying. The refugess said: To us that would mean being closed in concentration camps, which we do not want, since many of us have felt the burden of the democracy of the new Croatian state, in prisons and camps.

The program for the settlement of Serbs in Baranja, the actualization of which started early this year, was supported. However, that does not mean that pressure of any kind will be made on the local non-Serb population that has been living and working here along with the Serbs and that took part in the defense of Baranja in 1991.

At yesterday's meeting of the refugees, among whom is a [words indistinct] number of Croats who, refusing to accept the authority of Franjo Tudjman, were forced to leave their homes, along with the Serbs, the new management of the local committee of the Beli Manastir association of refugees and the new representatives for the municipal assembly were elected.

The statement from the refugee meeting boils down to one thing: We will return. If it is not possible for us to return to the western parts of the Krajina, we will not leave Baranja. If Croatia does not observe the rights of the Serb people, we will see if the Croat refugees, who are fewer than the Serb ones, will be able to (?return) to Baranja and Srem without problems.

Croatia: Belgian Army Generals Comment on E. Slavonia

BR1503122396 Brussels BRTN-TV2 Television Network in Dutch 2030 GMT 14 Mar 96

[From the "Ter Zake" program—passages within quotation marks recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] As of today Belgian General Jozef Schoups is in command of the international UN peace force of 5,000 men in Eastern Slavonia, the last area in Croatia occupied by the Serbs. The UN force is to oversee the Serbs' disarmament as stipulated in the Dayton peace agreement. Over the last few days correspondent Carl Voet has visited the Croatian and Serb territories and accompanied Gen. Schoups on his trip through the area and his meetings with its leaders.

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[Correspondent Carl Voet] Osijek is located at the easternmost end of Croatia. The city has been on the front line for almost five years. In one to three years the Serbs will have to leave their last bulwark on Croatian territory. Osijek is at step one of peace although it still realizes that war is not yet over.

[Osijek Prefect Branimir Glavas, in Serbo-Croatian with Dutch subtitles] "This is the last chance for the leaders of the armed revolt to hand in their arms and accept reunification with Croatia. The world has asked Croatia to give peace a chance and Croatia has agreed to that."

[Voet] Glavas is the region's strong man. He changed his former battle dress for a nice suit. The warrior has become an honorable politician. However, this man, who used to bring the conflict with the Serbs to a head, has changed little.

[Glavas] "If this last peace effort fails, nobody will be able to prevent Croatia from deploying its Armed Forces to restore order in the occupied territories. If this happens, the international community will support Croatia." [passage omitted]

[Voet] In the devastated city of Vukovar, or what remains of it, Gen. Schoups has his first meeting with General Dusan Loncar, commander of the local Serb forces. Gen. Loncar is, so to speak, the leader of a revolt. However, he scarcely shows any signs of revolt.

[Gen. Dusan Loncar, in Serbo-Croatian with superimposed English translation and Dutch subtitles; transcribed from the English] "The intention of the Serb side, especially talking about this agreement on the demilitarization process, is that we will fulfill all commitments that the Serb side made in this agreement. This also includes the correct implementation of the disarmament agreement."

[Voet] This is the no-man's-land between Serbs and Croats. Here is one of the blue helmets' most advanced observation posts. During [Belgian] General Vandeweghe's command cross fire was frequent. But the most recent shooting took place some months ago. [passage omitted]

[Voet] "One rarely meets any Serb military here."

[Gen. Vandeweghe] "Indeed, very few. This proves that the demobilization process has already started. It is still unclear where we are at this moment, but obviously the situation is gradually normalizing."

[Voet] "Could this be proof that the Serbs are preparing for total disarmament?"

[Vandeweghe] "That is indeed very clear."

[Gen. Jozef Schoups] "The ultimate goal is the reintegration of this whole area into Croatia, and subsequent reconciliation. These are obviously ambitious goals which are explicitly described in the mandate. However, their implementation in the field has to be possible in a society which has had hard times over the last few years. I hope that the situation here will never end up in a massive flow of refugees in one or other direction. How many people will leave and how many will arrive is difficult to forecast. It will depend on the feeling of security here and the confidence that we might give these people. Nonetheless, it will be extremely difficult to avoid attempts to create panic. Undoubtedly the media will make such attempts to create panic to start up an exodus like in Sarajevo." [passage omitted]

[Voet] The blue helmets in this area are not heavily armed. Schoups will have some tanks at his disposal in coming months.

[Schoups] "Tanks will improve our credibility if we encounter any resistance. They are more of a deterrent, but their use is very doubtful because the roads are very narrow and the terrain very swampy. Our plan is to avoid creating more distress than there is already." [passage omitted]

Croatia: U.S. Policemen for IPTF To Arrive Mid-Mar

AU1503090396 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 9 Mar 96 p 15

[Report on interview with UNTAES official Douglas Coffman by Vinka Drezga; place and date not given: "Policemen Will Practice Human Rights"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Since January, when the first members of the International Police Task Force (IPTF) started to arrive, only about a hundred policemen have arrived in eastern Slavonia. Apart from the Norwegians, who were among the first to come, there will be law enforcement officers from Sweden, Norway, Brazil, France, and Ireland in the last occupied part of Croatia. Although new groups have been coming in daily, it is difficult to say when the deployment of the international policemen will be complete; that is, when law and order will finally start to be established in that part of Croatia, says Douglas Coffman, UNTAES [UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia] official for public relations. He explained:

Only one thing is sure, there will be between 450 and 600 international policemen deployed in Croatian Podunavlje [the Danube river basin]. The accommodation of the policemen is one of the main obstacles, because we are short of buildings for both the offices of the

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transitional administration and for the accommodation of the military officials. On the other hand, language also represents a big problem. As English is envisaged as the lingua franca of the policemen in the transitional period, the IPTF should have a good command of English. The biggest problem, however, is that it is almost impossible to find anyone who can speak English among the local population who is also a good policeman.

As Robert Gelbard, U.S. assistant secretary of state for international narcotics and law enforcement affairs, announced at the end of January, in the transitional period police patrols will be composed of a team of three men per jeep. One international policeman, a Croat, and a Serb will be directly subordinated to General Klein and the transitional administration; in other words, they will carry out orders given exclusively by the transitional administrator.

In line with the general task of monitoring the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1037 and the Basic Agreement on Eastern Slavonia, the IPTF is also in charge of establishing a local police force, for which the forces on the ground—mainly, Gen. Klein and the Swedish commander of the UN police, Hakan Jufors—have a free hand to organize the structure and size of the police forces. The IPTF will train the local police in technical skills and also supervise the reorganization of arrest procedures and the prison system. The IPTF will pay particular attention to training the local police in human rights issues. This should start in a couple of months at a training ground near Budapest, and last a couple of weeks.

Although John Shattuck, assistant secretary of state for human rights, announced a long time ago that some two hundred Americans would participate in the IPTF in Bosnia-Herzegovina and eastern Slavonia, none of them has arrived yet. That is partly understandable if we take into account the fact that in the United States the police forces do not function at the federal level, but are organized at the state and district level. The procedure for choosing members of the IPTF for eastern Slavonia is thus very complicated.

Last weekend, however, the U.S. ambassador to Croatia, Peter Galbraith, confirmed that American policemen would be deployed in the easternmost part of Croatia as early as mid-March.

The IPTF Headquarters as part of UNTAES is temporarily located in Erdut, but, according to Douglas Coffman's announcement, it will soon move to Vukovar. Then, the branch police headquarters will be established in Beli Manastir and Erdut, for the northern southern UNTAES sectors, respectively.

Croatia: Serb Official on Gen Klein's Statements

AU1503075996 Beli Manastir Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 12 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The people of Srem-Baranja Province are keeping up with the activity of the special envoys and other international community mediators and their measures with particular interest. This primarily relates to the assessments of the officials of the UN administration that will operate under UNTAES [UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia] mandate. It must be emphasized that the Serb people in this area cannot be satisfied with certain individuals and certain statements.

This concerns the statements of the highest UNTAES officials, who say one thing in Croatia and another in our province. Naturally, this cannot be taken as reliable presentation, as everyone knows what lies, tricks, and other kinds of manipulation Tudjman's servants have been using. The Serb people in Srem-Baranja Province want to believe [UN special envoy] General Jacques Klein's good intentions, as well as those of other UNTAES officials, which would be confirmed if denials were issued regarding some of their statements as carried by the Croatian press.

Slavko Dokmanovic, the president of the council of Srem-Baranja Province, stated that the leadership of our province will keep this in mind at the next meeting with Gen. Klein and will demand special explanations. In a interview, he talked about the current political and security situation in our area:

[Begin Dokmanovic recording] When we entered the negotiation process, the main principles we adhered to were avoiding war, casualties, destruction, and preserving the territory and [word indistinct]. The Erdut agreement, anticipating this, was signed within this framework. Moreover, in the course of the negotiation process we pointed out that the process is a complex one and that it will take time. The pressures from the international community to shorten the timeframe evidently had no basis, and we were quite right in demanding that the timeframe be extended.

It is common knowledge that the agreement anticipates one plus one year of UN transitional administration. Initially, we demanded five years [words indistinct] and two were agreed upon, but the (?deployment) of the UN administration has not started yet. Practically nothing except for intensive diplomatic activity occurred four months after the signing of the agreement, which means that the forces [words indistinct] that would guarantee safety at the demarcation line with the Croat side have not been deployed. Moreover, the UN administration

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has not been installed in Vukovar because administrator Klein has still not [words indistinct].

Preparing for what awaited us, we organized institutions that are at the disposal of the international community. These include professional relations in all the sections of society organization and the executive council of the province, whose secretariats and the professionals working within them have prepared programs for all the spheres and are able to make agreements with the UN administration and [words indistinct] concerning the resolution of problems.

Moreover, the functioning of the other spheres—in the economy and social services—leads towards stabilization. We faced continued threat of war on the part of Croatia for the long period of four years, and now is the time for all that to be set straight and for us to return to normal life.

Gen. Klein and his [words indistinct] visited this area three times. Most of the meetings were short, and I am sorry they were not longer. Most of the discussion concerned the general problems and the scope of the Erdut agreement. Some of the details concerning the Erdut agreement were not spelled out, but Gen. Klein's conduct in the area was fair; it boiled down to his and his administration's—including the military and police components—being here to protect this area, to protect the people, and to secure for them a peaceful and dignified life in which the use of force will be almost excluded. [sentence as heard]

According to the information that I have, and that has also appeared on the territory of Srem-Baranja Province, Gen. Klein's statements in the Croatian media differ from what was agreed upon here and from the Erdut agreement principles.

At the next meeting we will contact Gen. Klein and clear up these problems, the misunderstandings, and demand that all that was agreed upon be strictly observed. Once again, I would like to point out that we are not asking for anything more than what is contained in the Erdut agreement, but will also not settle for anything less.

I do not find the [words indistinct] clear; if they are not true, why have they not been denied? There must certainly be a certain amount of propaganda in this, as Croatia wants to make use of Gen. Klein's presence in certain Croatian towns, and it is possible that some of his statements were interpreted in the way that suits the Croatian side.

The first and most important step is to protect the territory and the people. The second part relates to economic recovery, for which plans have been made and priority given to spring sowing—for which it was agreed and set that all the agricultural land must be cultivated and that, regardless of the problems we are facing, we must find the resources for this to be done—as well as the recovery of the overall economy in this area.

Moreover, as far as the settlement in the area is concerned, it is our obligation—in accordance with both the Erdut agreement and the Dayton accord—to secure the care for the people who were driven out from other parts of the Socialist Republic of Croatia and to make it possible for them to live in a decent and civilized way. Programs are being put together, and [words indistinct] will be presented to the people, that is, to the people who want to return.

Manipulations with this problem are frequent. The Croatian media have been trying to prevent this process through their propaganda, in a way, but this is specifically determined by the Erdut agreement and the Dayton accord, and we will abide by that. However, considering the cold winter and resources, the process of providing housing and the overall existence of the people who wish to come here will start in May. [sentence as heard]

From the time the conflict in the region started, Croatia has been spreading vicious and unprecedented propaganda that was initially aimed toward the world with the intention of portraying Croatia as the victim—unfortunately, this was successful—as well as to prevent the expansion of Serbia; that is, the creation of the so-called greater Serbia. This process is over—they are now aiming all of their propaganda toward this area, the main intention of which is to frighten the people here and to have as many people as possible leave and this territory [words indistinct].

This territory is Serb—it was and it will be—and I sincerely hope that we will successfully resist the propaganda, will not fall for this intimidation, will stay here, and that more people will come here. [Words indistinct] a clear aim, not only [words indistinct] Croatian policy and [words indistinct] and serve the purpose of reducing the tensions within Croatia, [words indistinct] the problems in Croatia that are primarily social and economical, as well as to [word indistinct] for everything that is happening to them, in the other parts of the Socialist Republic of Croatia, to divert their attention to [words indistinct] that Serbs are responsible for what is happening in Rijeka, Varazdin, Zagreb, and other cities.

[Passage indistinct] but this process has a beginning, and it will certainly have an end. We will certainly resist that—we will withstand those pressures since we

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have endured much more difficult ones than those [end recording].

Croatia: Article Examines Status of Press

96BA0182B Zagreb BANKA in Serbo-Croatian Jan 96 pp 38-39

[Article by Natasa Kraljevic: "They All Want To Have a Newspaper"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The front page no longer sells newspapers in Croatia, although everywhere in the world this is one of the basic postulates of our branch, runs the brief comment on the chaos on the Croatian newspaper market coming from one of the shrewdest of the newspaper publishers, Uros Soskic, one time director of the firm Arena, and today co-owner, with two partners, of the firm Revije, which issues several large-circulation magazines: SUPER TEEN, MOJA SUDBINA [My Fate], MOJA TAJNA [My Secret], AUTO BLIC [Auto Flash], and so on. About 1,100 newspapers and magazines are sold at our newsstands, about 400 of them domestic. In addition, about a dozen new publications appear every month, whether special supplements of existing papers or altogether new titles which have just begun to seek their place under the sun.

Why is such a small and poor market like the Croatian market suddenly flooded with so many publications? Is publishing that profitable?

What all the public and secret reasons why someone would decide to publish a newspaper are is not so important, but it does not seem always to be their profitability. Newspapers in Croatia are simply expensive: Circulation is mainly small, printing is expensive because the machines are old or unprofitable, although many newspapers are now printed abroad, in Italy and Austria, and the taxes are almost the same as in Western Europe. In the end, less than 50 percent of proceeds from copies sold is left to the publisher.

Small Polluters of the Market

Although about eight and a half million copies of various newspapers are sold every month at Tisak's newsstands, only a few publishers of daily newspapers and the weeklies GLOBUS and GLORIJA have large circulations. According to figures published in GLOBUS in November, the paid circulation of VECERNJI LIST ranged about 154,500, that of SLOBODNA DALMACIJA about 96,000 copies, and other strong daily newspapers include the regional papers NOVI LIST and GLAS ISTRE of Rijeka, which with a circulation of about 50,000 are essentially stronger than the national daily VJESNIK, which has a paid circulation of about 32,000. The only others mentioned as significant are those put out by Europapress Holding, owner of the large-circulation publications GLOBUS, GLORIJA, ARENA, MILA, and others. The only competitors of their publications in color are those from the publishing house Revije, which we have mentioned, and more recently the weekly NACIONAL.

Soskic and other major publishers say that their most dangerous competitors are small publishers with publications whose paid circulation ranges from 1,000 to 5,000; they publish occasionally and then die out, they change their publishing schedule, they begin as weeklies, quickly become biweeklies, and gradually monthlies, and no one can remember their names. Usually, they are put out by only a few people, they come down to copying foreign or even similar domestic publications, and the financial calculation of the publishers is based on a paid circulation of only a few thousand, which in such an inexpensive production operation is enough to cover the basic costs and very small earnings.

Thus, at the moment one can buy about a dozen crossword publications. Or, during last year no fewer than nine periodicals appeared with the word "auto" in the title, although their biggest competitors are AUTO KLUB, put out by Europapress Holding, and AUTO BLIC, put out by Revije.

"Other periodicals of similar profile take from us only a few percentage points of the market, but the problem is that they make a jumble at the newsstand and confuse the customer who has trouble finding his periodical in the pile of similar titles. That makes it difficult to promote a periodical, and we invest a very large amount of money in advertising so that we might in the end attract a customer," says Mr. Soskic, adding that many are simply polluting the market. We leave it to readers to judge to what extent these views are in harmony with the logic of the market, especially because many people are also applying the word "pollution" to the large-circulation publications.

"We are not afraid of the market, but we hope that in a few years the Croatian periodical market will straighten itself out, because now topsy-turvy relations have been set up. We want to be dealing only with competitors who, like us, make their living solely from periodicals, not those who use periodicals to launder money or satisfy certain personal needs," Soskic comments.

"We are taking great pains to hold our own and win out in the competition with GLOBUS, and I believe that the readers have the most to gain from this," says Mladen Plese, managing director and one of the editors of NACIONAL, a weekly which appeared recently as competition for the already established GLOBUS,

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which, as the public is already aware, actually gave birth to it by what we would call "simple division."

"Even now, we are offering a third more text than our competition, our photographs are bigger, we are doing a photo strip such as we never could have published in GLOBUS. We believe we have brought together the best journalism team here, and we will soon become the best paper in the country," says Ivo Pukanic, editor in chief.

According to Mladen Plese, one of the shareholders of NACIONAL and the paper's managing director, eight of them put together capital of about 1 million German marks [DM], which is enough to publish the first six or seven issues; if sales proceeds come in faster than 45 days, even a smaller amount would have been sufficient. Already they have spent nearly DM150,000 on an advertising campaign, and they intend to continue investing until readers become altogether accustomed to the paper.

At GLOBUS, by contrast, they say their circulation has fallen by only 1 percent and that for the present they do not consider NACIONAL much competition.

Before publication of NACIONAL, there were whispers for months in Zagreb that a new newsmagazine would be started, or even an elite women's magazine, but the team obviously did not dare to undertake such a challenge.

"We could not experiment with the first publication, we had to pick something surefire, because our market is impoverished, the middle stratum has disappeared, and we have to shape periodicals to satisfy a broad range of readers: both those who want spectacular headlines and those who want analytical reading matter," Plese adds. "For other periodicals, we will have to wait some time yet."

Unprofitable Printing Plants

There is also competition among printing plants. According to Uros Soskic, the publisher of a magazine in color must today choose where he will get his printing done, because in Zagreb there are two new offset color machines available: the Radin Printing Plant and the Croatian Printing Plant, where the new machine has just gone into operation, and then there is the respectable Rijeka Printing Plant, and semiweekly and monthly publications can even be printed abroad, in Italy or Austria. Another problem is that our printing plants do not meet a high standard, most of all because of the human factor: No one knows as yet how to do good work on the new machines. In spite of the greater competition, printing prices are still high because the print runs are small, and so the machines are underutilized. Radin, one of the largest printing plants, is working on only one shift, although the machines would be profitable only if they run day and night.

The Distribution Monopoly

But the issue of sales and distribution is a much more sensitive question for the publishers at this moment. That is, Tisak has 980 sales points of its own throughout Croatia, about 200 of them in Zagreb, about 300 which it opens during the tourist season, and distribution takes place at a total of 4,400 sales points.

Tisak is undoubtedly the strongest in its branch, because it has only regional competition: in Dalmatia, in Istria, and in the northern coastal area, where SLOBODNA DALMACIJA and NOVI LIST and GLAS ISTRE have a larger number of stands. It is clear, then, that each publisher is frightened about what the ownership structure will be in our largest distributor and seller of periodicals. At present, the state owns slightly more than 50 percent of the shares, represented by HVIDRA [expansion unknown], MIOR [expansion unknown], and the Privatization Fund, while small shareholders have the rest.

Will a significant private sales and distribution network develop in Croatia? Probably not very fast. For the present, the largest private firm in the business of selling, printing, and distributing periodicals is Distri-Press, owned by Ivan Granic, who spent a dozen years discovering the secrets of this job at Tisak, and who two years ago decided to become a private operator. Distri-Press has about 750 sales outlets, mainly private newsstands and sellers who conclude contracts with the small and agile private firm instead of the huge Tisak.

"So we are not real competition for Tisak, because retail sales are our specialty," Granic says.

The emergence of similar firms would also be of interest to publishers because the terms of sale would then probably be more favorable for them. That is, Tisak takes a higher discount from publishers than Distri-Press. On daily publications, it takes an 18-percent discount, on weeklies 22 percent, on biweeklies 25 percent, and occasionally 30 percent, and another 4 percent is calculated against the entire printing, whether it is sold or not, for transport and the same amount for handling returns. Distri-Press, however, collects a discount of 20 to 27 percent, which includes all costs, but it applies them only to paid circulation. The count on the returns is always right, while at Tisak the discrepancy between copies sold and returned is a constant problem for all publishers.

"Publishers ought to have the same conditions at all sales outlets, which the wholesalers guarantee them

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elsewhere in the world. There is a kind of linkage between the editorial office and the sales network, created above all to protect the publisher," Ivan Granic explains.

The events on our market for periodicals are really stormy, but probably it will soon be evident that quantity yields quality, and in the end the readers will profit the most.

Croatia: Istria Thermal Electric Power Plant Controversy

96BA0192D Zagreb HRVATSKI OBZOR in Serbo-Croatian 12 Feb 96 pp 32-33

[Article by Ratko Peter: "Sulfur Dioxide Does Not Bother the Zupan"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Is there a new crisis on the horizon in Istria, this time a crisis concerning economic policy? Although the problem area referred to certainly should not be political, current events concerning the completion of construction of the Plomin II thermal electric power plant indicate that politics are deeply involved in this area as well. In short, recent steps indicate that in politically seismic Istria, even an exact science like power engineering will be pushed into political waters and by some inglorious automatism will take on the now traditional characteristics of the perpetual conflict between Istria and (political) Zagreb. In short, politicization has once again become inevitable.

The Croatian Electric Power Industry [HEP], as a state-owned public enterprise, in other words, the government, intended to complete construction of the coal-fired thermal electric power plant Plomin II, and to do so as an extension of the already completed Plomin I power plant, but also as a crucial investment priority for the fuel and power industry and for the state. It is in that context that engineer Damir Begovic, general managing director of the HEP, would say that it is "an imperative to complete the Plomin II thermal electric power plant, but also to revitalize Plomin I. They would then have 300 megawatts of power, and that would be a respectable capacity, corresponding to the Croatian part of the Krsko nuclear plant. We will try to complete it in two years." At the same time, the local government, i.e., Istria Zupanija, does not share that opinion, their view is that the production begun should be halted and that at this point both Plomin I and the initiated Plomin II should be retrofitted for the more acceptable gas, which will not collide with environmental standards. A referendum of the local population has been announced to that effect, the first of its kind in postcommunist Croatia.

100 Percent Against

Given the political map of Istria, it is not difficult to conclude that a conflict is inevitable between "tutorial Zagreb" and "discontented Istria." Council members of Istria Zupanija have unanimously adopted a decision calling for "a referendum on environmental protection" in their zupanija. The condition was met for calling a referendum (an initiative with 10,000 signatures), and, as matters stand, the citizens of Istria will very soon find themselves with ballots and ballot boxes, this time those of the referendum. The referendum question has already been drafted in this connection, and it runs like this: "Are you in favor of continuing construction of the coal-fired thermal electric power plant Plomin II?" According to certain rough surveys of Istrian public opinion, but also according to the general mood of the local population, the outcome of the referendum should not be in doubt; as a matter of fact, there are even those who predict a fantastic 100-percent opposition to the continued construction of the coal-fired thermal electric power plant.

In order to analyze the situation at the moment in and around Plomin I and II, perhaps it would be good to go back a bit. The split over the idea of continuing construction of this thermal electric power plant actually occurred in Istria. According to the esteemed Pula environmentalist Dr. Darko Martincic, until recently a city council member in Pula responsible for environmental protection, Luciano Delbianco, M.A., zupan of Istria, accepted the idea of continuing construction of Plomin II in spite of the manifold opposition. "Yes, until recently I was in conflict over that with Zupan Delbianco, because he was inclined to accept certain values of sulfur dioxide emission which are unacceptable for the environment. Delbianco represented the interests of the HEP, for what reasons I know not, probably this is clear only to him. In any case, it is also evident from this most recent debate that the zupan still takes the view that construction of the thermal electric power plant should be continued. Even in a recent meeting of power engineers in Opatija, I personally said that the continuation of construction would be unacceptable, because we had a bitter experience with Plomin I, primarily with high radioactivity, with high uranium concentration, high concentration of sulfur dioxide, etc. It is clear that the HEP is looking to its own economic interests; they have investors outside the country who will be selling them coal and investing additional funds to complete construction of the Plomin II thermal electric power plant. Because Plomin II is about 60-percent completed, I take the position that its construction should not be completed. After all, now that we have committed ourselves to a maintainable development, we now are in a position of not

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building something which we will have to change tomorrow. So, let us immediately start to retrofit the existing complexes at the power plant, which would be fired with gas as a fuel. The argument against this is the high price of natural gas, but in building and completing Plomin II we will have to invest between 350 and 400 million German marks [DM]. I think this is more than retrofitting for gas, because the present system has become old, no investment was made in it at all.... Beyond that, if all protective measures are respected, as they say at the HEP, then they will have to buy a system for desulfurization (which costs at least DM100 million), a water treatment system, a piling system for the coal, limestone, and gypsum as an end product, as well as for the ash and slag, and then there is also the coal terminal. When all of that is added together and compared to the price of a gas-fired power plant with the same capacity, we come to the conclusion that the latter is much cheaper."

Delbianco's Rebuttal

The most paradoxical thing in the entire Plomin story is that the referendum, and thereby the open confrontations, began at a time when no professional studies had been presented to the public, that same public which in a few days will be voting against construction of the thermal electric power plant and thereby winning points every day for Jakovcic's party. One therefore gets the impression that almost nothing can be solved in Istria without the now stereotypical conflict between the local and central authorities, simplified as the IDS [Istrian Democratic Conference] against the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union].

Preparing a preliminary study on the feasibility of using gas at the Plomin I and II thermal electric power plants is simply a necessity, because so far this has not been documented and presented properly to the public. Because the orientation toward tourism and agriculture is a strategic commitment of Istria, but also of Croatia as a whole, it is logical that the Plomin thermal electric power plant, at least with the performances on which Plomin I is based, cannot fit into that orientation at all. Damir Begovic, managing director of the HEP, promises "the highest standards of protection," but because that protection has already been deficient, certain doubts are altogether justified. Which is why Dino Debeljuh would say that "the citizens of Istria simply do not have confidence in the HEP, because over the last 25 years they have seen the behavior of that institution. There still is no desulfurization equipment in spite of the numerous promises."

In any case, before the recent meeting of the HEP and Istria Zupanija, those same institutions also met in September 1994, but then they "studied the need for the possibility of using gas," and then at the last meeting this was rejected. Many people associate this with the written consent not so long ago from Zupan Delbianco for the continuation of construction of Plomin II, although the zupanija believes that "gas should certainly be adopted, even if it means more expensive electricity." Generally speaking, that gesture by Zupan Delbianco is surprising, to say the least, because a certain practice of unanimous (political) opinions (especially toward initiatives from Zagreb) has now become established on the peninsula; Delbianco's "rebuttal" can perhaps be classified as a momentary party split, or perhaps as a case of the zupan's pragmatism, taking the view that even the referendum is not going to change very much.

The Silent IDS

"The trend with the old and outdated coal-fired thermal electric power plants in the world (the Netherlands, Denmark, Germany) is to revitalize them so that in the end only gas is used as a fuel," Dr. Martincic believes. "Certain technical and technological advances (installation of an additional gas turbine and retrofitting the present boiler as a steam turbine, which is unquestionably technically feasible) could increase the energy efficiency of that power plant to 60 percent, which is not the case with coal-fired thermal electric power plants, because in that version maximum efficiency is 33-35 percent. The counterargument usually made to this thesis is that that fuel is more expensive than coal. However, the effect of the higher price of the gas is reduced by the greater energy efficiency. Finally, why not use gas from the Adriatic seabed, or grant a concession to foreign investors, if we know that those quantities can provide fuel to the power plant for the next 15 years."

The referendum on the continued construction of Plomin II is the immediate future in Istria; the big question is what it will manage to change in the end game. That is, even after a response in the negative, the government still has the last word. According to Damir Begovic, it is difficult to believe that anything will change in that regard. At the same time, at the political level the IDS will homogenize the electorate by means of Plomin; and perhaps this has been the dominant intention of the leaders of the Istrian party. Now that we have mentioned the IDS, it has been impossible to obtain from the party any information whatsoever concerning the Plomin problem; Ivan Pauletta, vice president of the IDS, said that "the position of the party is, for the present, not to make any statements for the media at all on this topic."

In any case, the conflict between the local and central authorities is again on the horizon, this time concerning

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the Plomin thermal electric power plant. The topic of energy is the occasion for the referendum, but without the public having been familiarized in advance with any professional or competent study that would explain the entire problem of Plomin, for or against gas or coal, and so on. What remains is the tense atmosphere and expectation of a new (political) conflict between Istria and the central government. Perhaps that has been the main intention anyway.

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FYROM: SDSM's Popovski Views New Government

AU1403175696 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 14 Mar 96 p 2

[Interview with SDSM Secretary Ljubomir Popovski by Zorica Darkovska; place and date not given: "Dissociation Did Not Destabilize the State"]

[FBIS Translated Text] SDSM [Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia] Secretary Ljubomir Popovski is a moderate and a party activist without too much exposure. He is serving his second term of office as a member of the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] and has so far shown great restraint. Nevertheless, whenever he finds it necessary to clarify the party's view on some important issue, he does it in a much more astute way than his party colleagues. This time we have been discussing with Ljubomir Popovski the recent developments on the political scene in Macedonia.

[Darkovska] Mr. Popovski, has the SDSM analyzed the recent events related to the reconstruction of the authorities, that is the election of a new government?

[Popovski] We, as a responsible political party, have laboriously analyzed the events that have taken place over the last two months and which are mainly related to the reconstruction of the government. In doing this, we have evaluated all the factors that could influence the decision of the SDSM Central Board, taking into account all the positive and negative aspects. Basically, the whole process has taken place within the framework of parliamentary democratic principles. In fact, we have rejected all opinions and views that the reconstruction of the authorities could lead to political instability in the state. So, the situation over the last two months can be assessed as normal, and the nonparticipation of the Liberal Party in the new government has not generated any substantial disorder on the political scene of the Republic of Macedonia.

[Darkovska] Considering all the recent events, can we say that the election platform of the Alliance for Macedonia has been abandoned and that the people who voted for the Alliance have been betrayed?

[Popovski] We cannot say that the election program of the Alliance for Macedonia has been abandoned. Our party is sticking to the basic goals and aims that were in the platform that the election coalition, that is the Alliance for Macedonia, presented. We even believe that a part of these aims has already been achieved, while a further part has still to be fulfilled, and this is the general directions of the activities of the government and the party. As for whether the expectations of the voters have been betrayed, I think that they voted for the aims of the election program and not only for a particular party or person. In a way, we can strongly guarantee that we will not abandon it and we cannot say that the voters have been betrayed.

[Darkovska] For you, the Alliance still exists and you explicitly said that it was your intention to promote it. What does that mean?

[Popovski] This was, first of all, an alliance that was created on particular policies that remain legitimate. We do not view it as a closed and exclusive political structure, but as open to all political parties that adhere to the policies in the election program and that believe that they can join it.

[Darkovska] Unlike your claims that the reconstruction of the government was carried out within a normal procedure, it has been commented that there have been many slipups and that the Constitution has even been violated.

[Popovski] These allegations are not true simply because the new government was reconstructed with over a third of the members of the old government, which is in line with Articles 93 and 94 of the Constitution. Since this was a proposal made by the prime minister, and not by somebody forming a new government, we do not believe that the constitutional regulation on elections has been violated. Furthermore, Branko Crvenkovski was not forming the government for the Alliance for Macedonia because there is no such political structure or party, but he was given the mandate by the SDSM, as the party with the majority in parliament. Since it was an election coalition, he included the Liberal and the Socialist parties as well. He even went beyond this and another party was also given the chance to participate, the PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity], which was outside the Alliance. So, the executive was not a real copy of the election coalition.

[Darkovska] Does this mean that you did not find it necessary to reexamine the mandate in this situation?

[Popovski] Absolutely not. There were no elements for such a process.

[Darkovska] Does the new government have the support of the president of the state?

[Popovski] During the last five years of multiparty life in Macedonia there has been excellent cooperation between the state president and the SDSM, as well as with the former governments in which our party had participated. If we know that there is full agreement between the SDSM and the state president on the basic

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policy aims that set out the future strategic political course of the country, there need be no doubt that this good cooperation and mutual support and respect will continue in the future.

[Darkovska] What is your comment on some public assessments that the SDSM is pushing the state president aside and that this actually represents "a second political assassination attempt against him"?

[Popovski] These views of a part of the extraparliamentary opposition are equally false, that is to say it is not true that this represents a second political assassination attempt, particularly because they come from individuals and political parties that have in the past denied the legitimacy of the president of the Republic of Macedonia and have criticized his general policy. There are no changes in the relationship toward the state president. As before, he is on a high level and has the full respect of the SDSM, just as he did before. These relations are something more than just a constitutional or political relationship with the president, and I can say that we are proceeding with joint work on the projected goals and aims in our foreign and internal policy, whose founder was Kiro Gligorov.

[Darkovska] Some are inclined to see the reconstruction of the government as an activity of a group from your party with the aim of stopping power from falling into the hands of one person.

[Popovski] I do not agree with such views and thoughts that can be heard these days. We have simply started from the view that is determined by the principle of political responsibility. All participants in the government must have a clearly defined responsibility because this is one of the basic principles of parliamentary democracy. So, the idea was not to do all this with the purpose of endorsing or restricting somebody's constitutional power, and particularly not that of the state president.

[Darkovska] Interior Minister Tomislav Cokrevski recently gave an interview to PULS in which he emphasized the need for an independent and more daring group that would take over responsibility for the country's future. Is this your party's view?

[Popovski] It has nothing to do with a group of people in the party to decide on the overall fate of the state and the policy of the government, parliament, and the party. It is a stance that was arrived at through a normal party process, within the bodies of the party over the last two months, on the basis of making analyses in which the whole party took part. The conclusion, which was presented in public, was that those in power must be fully responsible for what they do. So this has nothing to do with the context in which this question was raised.

[Darkovska] Before the reconstruction, Ljubomir Frckovski, then minister of interior, publicly called on the Liberals to leave the coalition. You personally qualified this as his own opinion, but you also added that such statements could be politically dangerous. What is your opinion today?

[Popovski] I responded at the time by saying that this was his personal opinion and I also said that it was not the view of the party. That was then! This attitude toward the LP [Liberal Party] was later adopted as our party's view as a result of a democratically implemented party process.

[Darkovska] There are different views on the end of the partnership between the SDSM and the LP. According to some, the danger of political instability in the country has been avoided by leaving the Liberals outside the government, while others say that their removal could generate destabilization.

[Popovski] Basically, it is wrong to link the whole political stability in a state or the functioning of its political system with views and events that have been produced by some political parties. It would imply that you attach too much importance to the political parties. They have their place in the political system, but the main role is played by the legally elected bodies—the president of the state, parliament, and the government.

[Darkovska] How can you define current relations between the SDSM and the LP?

[Popovski] We expect the Liberal Party to play a positive role as a parliamentary opposition party and, in this sense, our general view is that this may represent a new step and a new challenge for parliamentary life and democracy in Macedonia. Of course, if they really act in this way. However, I disagree with the assessments that this means that responsibility has been disavowed. On the contrary, it is now more emphasized and it enables all the constitutional mechanisms to be revitalized in the sense of exercising checks over the work of the government. This can come to its full expression now with the activities of the opposition in parliament.

[Darkovska] Responsibility has now been clarified and taken over. For what do you, as a party, have concrete responsibility?

[Popovski] We, as a party, have never evaded responsibility. In some concrete cases, this has been particularly emphasized because our participation, for instance in parliament, is large since we have a parliamentary group of 60 people and because we are also the dominating factor in the executive. These facts point to the great burden of responsibility for everything that will be taking place in the future, either good or bad, on

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our shoulders in the first place, but also on those of the other coalition partners participating in the present government.

[Darkovska] In your opinion, does this mean that the present situation in which the prime minister and assembly chairman are members of your party is contrary to the principles of democracy, or is there a logic in this, considering your majority?

[Popovski] If we respect the basic principles of parliamentary democracy, then it is quite normal for this to happen, because we cannot neglect the actual party potentials of the parliamentary groups. In this sense, we must not fear that democracy is restricted or endangered in any way because the leading individuals in parliament and government come from the same party. Content is important, and now the Assembly has the possibility to become a real parliament with a real parliamentary opposition. In the past, we had members from different parties; for instance the assembly chairman came from the LP and yet parliament was said to be uncontested and one-party.

[Darkovska] It is a practice in other countries for coalition partners to sign an agreement on mutual duties and relations. Why is there no such thing here?

[Popovski] It may be because we are learning about democracy, about the mechanisms of coalitions, and about how to make them official in certain documents. In any case, before the elections in 1994, there was a political agreement on coalition among the SDSM, the LP, and the SPM [Socialist Party of Macedonia]. There was no protocol that contained all the elements of mutual relations or a possible breakup and consequent activities. I do not know if there is such a practice in other countries.

[Darkovska] What did this political agreement comprise, and who disrupted it so that it came to a breakup of the partnership with the Liberals?

[Popovski] Basically, it was an agreement that it was good for the three parties to run in the elections together. The public is familiar with everything that took place after the elections and after the election of the government, up to the breakup of the coalition. It all started when one party refrained from supporting the government, which was unprecedented in parliament.

[Darkovska] What would lead you to call early elections in the country?

[Popovski] At least three conditions should be present in the state in order to think about early elections. The first is if there were a parliamentary crisis and Parliament could not function. This is not the case today. The second is if there were a government crisis, that is if a government could not be composed, if it could not be elected, or if there were problems in its functioning, so that it could not act as the executive. Finally, the third is if there were an emergency that endangers the whole political, economic, legal, or judiciary system, and so on. Not one of these conditions at the moment exists; just that a part of the political parties that are grouped outside parliament have finally understood and admitted their mistake in boycotting the second round of the 1994 parliamentary elections.

FYROM: Poll Shows Response to Coalition Dissolution

AU1503081296 Skopje MIC in English 14 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] A survey entitled "Opinion of citizens of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Maceodnia—FYROM] on events in and about the Alliance for Macedonia," which was exclusively done for NOVA MAKEDONIJA by "Data Press" Agency, has shown that 48.17 percent of the interviewed 1,200 citizens think that with the end of the SDSM-LP [Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia-Liberal Party] coalition the voters of the Alliance have been betrayed, says MAKPRES.

On the question if after the break-up of the partnership of the two parties the platform of the Alliance can be realized, 37.33 percent say that it is impossible.

30.5 percent assess that SDSM-LP break-up was aimed at overcoming party interests, and 28.5 percent see it as an attempt for new political restructuring in the new elections.

At the last elections, out of 1,200 interviewed citizens 44 percent stated that they had not voted for the Alliance. Out of those who had voted for the Alliance, 39.17 percent said that they had given their votes to the president of the country Kiro Gligorov. The purpose of the survey, which started in the second half of the last month and ended yesterday, was to feel the pulse of the voters regarding the events around the developments in and about the Alliance for Macedonia.

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Poland: Media Reaction to Antiterrorism Summit

WS1503091196

[FBIS Report] On 14 March two major Warsaw vernacular dailies carried commentaries on the international antiterrorism summit in Sharm al-Shaykh.

RZECZPOSPOLITA, a centrist daily widely read in government circles, on page 5 carries a 700-word commentary by Teresa Stylinska under the title "Good and Bad Terrorism." "The very name of the summit in Sharm al-Shaykh," says the author in the opening paragraph, "is misleading: the summit was only seemingly devoted to counteracting terrorism. The chief objective was to salvage the Middle East peace process and prevent fundamentalists from destroying it completely." Stylinska remarks that this was "one of those widely advertised meetings from which hardly anything but trite declarations can be expected." "Each of the participants," she points out, "undeniably had something to gain. Clinton wanted to strengthen his position before the elections and demonstrate that his foreign policy is successful. Peres wanted to rebut charges raised by the right, which claims that he is incapable of holding back the fundamentalists. For Yeltsin, the summit offered an opportunity to show that Russia, albeit weakened, continues to take part in major world events. The Arab leaders demonstrated their concern for the problems of their region and, for many a first, their solidarity with Israel. If it were not for the fact that the summit was devoted to the very crucial region the Middle East is, how many of them would have bothered to go to the remote Red Sea resort?"

The author states the situation is reminiscent of "Kuwait and the war with Iraq several years ago: Western states pull their ranks together whenever they have a vested interest, deftly overcoming all divisions and hostility." "Is anybody concerned with counteracting terrorism in places where it is no less dangerous than in Israel—for example, in Algeria, Peru, Pakistan, Sri Lanka?" asks Stylinska. "In human terms, there is no difference. The Middle East is simply more important politically. What would a visit to Colombo do to help Clinton? It turns out there are two types of terrorism: one that you have to fight fiercly, and one that can be merely condemned on ethical grounds."

ZYCIE WARSZAWY, a center-right daily, carries a front-page commentary of 250 words by Dorota Golebiewska entitled "Scolded Terrorists." Golebiewska echoes the RZECZPOSPOLITA item by saying that the summit "has shown Israeli public opinion that the authors of the peace process still have the support of the entire world. Apart from general declarations, it has not solved anything."

"The only problem," the author goes on to say, "is that the Israeli people no longer want declarations. They want to feel safe in their city streets." Golebiowska concludes: "Neither the suicide bombers nor their leaders nor the Middle East states that sponsor them will be scared by the barking and scolding of politicians."

Poland: Deputy Defense Minister on NATO, Jets, Draft

WS1503100096 Warsaw Radio RMF FM Network in Polish 0705 GMT 14 Mar 96

[Interview with Polish Deputy Defense Minister Andrzej Karkoszka by Konrad Piasecki at the Radio RMF FM studio in Warsaw on the "Guest of the RMF FM Morning Program"—live]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Piasecki] What sin did General Jan Kuriata commit that he had to quit the Ministry of National Defense [MON]?

[Karkoszka] There was no sin, or perhaps he was simply born too early. He is now much older than I, and, sooner or later, the time comes when everyone has to say goodbye.

[Piasecki] Why then does one hears rumors to the effect that the primary reason behind his dismissal was the sale of armored personnel carriers conducted without informing the MON chief? Are those rumors absolutely groundless?

[Karkoszka] They are absolutely groundless. Gen. Kuriata was a very good deputy defense minister and a very good colleague, whom we all liked.

[Piasecki] Someone now has to replace him. Who will that be?

[Karkoszka] It might be too early to discuss this issue. In addition, I am not the one to make this decision, which will be made personally by Defense Minister Dobrzanski and, naturally, the prime minister.

[Piasecki] Will that be General Roman Musial? Is it correct that he is among the candidates?

[Karkoszka] I read about this in GAZETA WYBORCZA.

[Piasecki] You only read about it?

[Karkoszka] Correct, I only read about it.

[Piasecki] National Security Bureau Chief Jerzy Milewski said—I think it was two days ago—that the delay in Poland's admission to NATO is, among other things, a result of the conservatism of the people in command of the Polish Army. Are you and your colleagues conservative?

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[Karkoszka] Definitely neither I nor my colleagues are conservative. In any case, it would be worth asking Minister Milewski what he meant. I, as head of the MON commission that works on restructuring the governing bodies of MON and the General Staff, have an absolutely different idea. Particularly now, after the resolution on the defense minister's activities has been passed, great progress has been made namely in the area in which we were weak and for which we were constantly criticized by our NATO partners: the area of democratic control over the Army. As far as the formal side is concerned, within the next two months this issue will be resolved in such a way that we will no longer be submitted to criticism, remarks, ridicule, or bullying from either inside or outside the state. I think that, naturally, there is conservatism in every institution undergoing reform, which means that a number of people lose their jobs, get transferred, and are not confident about their future. Thus, there is a certain kind of conservatism, but it is not essential and does not cause major conflicts. I would like to underscore that we have very good cooperation between MON and the General Staff officers and generals. We work for three to five hours every other day on this issue. We are making progress. Things are delayed by a week or two, but this is due to the essence of the issue—a very expansive one.

[Piasecki] Do you think the delay in Poland's admission to NATO is a result of the bad international climate or the attitude toward this problem in the international arena? Or is it a result of the fact that the Polish Army is not good enough?

[Karkoszka] One can use the word "delay" only when referring to a specific time. Only then can we say that something is being delayed. Meanwhile, there is no delay and everything is going according to plan. Naturally, our wishes, Poland's wishes, were to join NATO right in 1991, immediately after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. A political decision was made, and back in 1992 Poland's security concept was developed and there were talks about the great will of Polish society, political elites, and the entire state to integrate with NATO. Hence, from the perspective of our, I would say, selfish yet well-grounded wishes, in fact some sort of delay exits. However, in light of NATO's plans as well as other states' plans—keep in mind there are 15 of them—there is no delay. On the contrary, the integration process is going extremely rapidly.

[Piasecki] When, in your opinion, will the Polish Army be equal to the NATO armies?

[Karkoszka] You would have to specify the criteria that we should apply. I believe the Polish Army is much better, for instance, in terms of dedication to its cause and of its morale. The so-called army spirit is very strong.

[Piasecki] In which terms is it much worse then?

[Karkoszka] Speaking about hardware, it is much worse in many cases. However, it is not due to any kind of errors; it is simply due to economic and budget reasons. As we know, the budget currently deals with much greater problems, trying to overcome the slump of the past 10 or so years.

[Piasecki] Speaking about the budget and hardware, what is the status of the issue of purchasing the Alpha Jet and Iryda aircraft? Will it be resolved soon?

[Karkoszka] I can only say that certain consultations have been held to present the Army's demands to producers. If producers accept those requirements and if their products meet specific technical standards, we will purchase them.

[Piasecki] You are talking about the Iryda aircraft, I presume.

[Karkoszka] Naturally.

[Piasecki] And is the issue of purchasing Alpha Jets still on the agenda?

[Karkoszka] The Alpha Jets have been properly mothballed. We have inspected them, and most of them are in perfect technical condition. If we could purchase them, I believe it would be advantageous only in military terms. Of course, the interests of the Polish defense industry, of Polish workers, the market, and all of the sociopolitical ramifications make us think very carefully about how to resolve this problem.

[Piasecki] When will you and MON make a decision on the Iryda aircraft? What is the deadline?

[Karkoszka] I am not authorized to make this decision. I deal with developing Poland's defense policy, our foreign relations, our state's defense system. This decision rests with the Council of Ministers and the Committee for Defense Issues. I think the issue will be resolved by the end of 1996, and a decision will be made on whether to produce, and hence purchase, the Iryda aircraft.

[Piasecki] Did you serve in the Army?

[Karkoszka] Of course. I am a reserve officer.

[Piasecki] Are you not upset to see newspapers publishing long lists of grounds that allegedly enable young people to dodge the draft? Are you not upset by the fact that young men's enthusiasm with regard to Army service is rather low?

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[Karkoszka] I am upset, indeed. Moreover, I never help acquaintances who come to seek my help in protecting their offspring from Army service. In the past, I also thought that Army service was a waste of time and a useless interval in one's life. However, everyone should spend the time in the Army envisioned by the law and national interests. It might even be a good sign that young men believe we ..e not threatened by anyone and, in fact, think why in hell go into the Army? Why not delegate Army service to professionals who would make money at it? We are moving in that direction. On the one hand, we evaluate the international situation around Poland as very good, extremely good. We already have one more generation that is not afraid of a foreign threat. Thus, we have an effect: Young people do not feel any pressure. However, I think that, if they noticed any threat to Poland, they would immediately take the kind of stance we anticipate.

[Piasecki] The draft is a hot topic. It seems that one stage of it just started. How many men can the Polish Army absorb? How many of them will be transferred to the reserves? What will happen to graduates of the higher education institutions?

[Karkoszka] It is hard to cite those figures off the top of my head, but about half the people eligible for Army service will not serve. First, the Army simply does not need so many draftees in light of reductions; second, there are valid grounds to relieve a certain group of people of military duty.

[Piasecki] What about graduates?

[Karkoszka] If we have money, they will be called up.

[Piasecki] Will they be called up in 1996?

[Karkoszka] I do not know. The decision does not rest with me.

[Piasecki] With whom does it rest, then?

[Karkoszka] There is an entire system of evaluating and drafting personnel, training the reserves, and training the officer corps, including officers on active service and in the reserves.

[Piasecki] But you said that if we have money they will be called up. Do we have money or not?

[Karkoszka] We know that for several years there has been no military training of graduates; from the perspective of national security, this is a very negative phenomenon. The Army needs first and second lieutenants, but they do not get trained.

[Piasecki] Those graduates who have received call-up papers, should they be afraid that they will be drafted?

[Karkoszka] They should not be afraid of anything. They should go and register at draft offices.

[Piasecki] They will not go into the Army?

[Karkoszka] Definitely, they will not.

[Piasecki] I hope we have assuaged them. Thank you for the interview.

Poland: Head of Equipment Procurement at MON Interviewed

WS1203151796 Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish 11 Mar 96 p 3

[Interview with Colonel Antoni Grzedzinski, director of the Ordnance and Equipment Supply Department of the Polish Ministry of National Defense, by Stanislaw Lukaszewski; place and date not given: "Personnel Changes in the Polish Armed Forces"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *On the basis of a decision issued by the Ministry of National Defense [MON] on 1 March, Colonel Master of Science Antoni Grzedzinski was appointed head of the Ordnance and Equipment Supply Department. His predecessor, Brigadier General Henryk Mika, has been suspended from his duties and remains at the disposal of the defense minister.*

Col. Grzedzinski graduated from the Military Technical Academy in 1967. He held various positions in the technical services of the Air Force. He was former chief technical inspector of the Polish Armed Forces. For the past two years he was a director in the deputy defense minister's office, where he was responsible for military equipment and the military infrastructure. To mark the occasion of his appointment, we conducted a short interview with Col. Grzedzinski.

[Lukaszewski] Ever since I can remember, you have always been very highly praised. At a certain time, however, you were sidetracked. Why?

[Grzedzinski] I do not see myself as having been sidetracked. Throughout the career of a professional soldier there is a time of performing duties that require dynamism, and there is a time for acquiring more knowledge, a different type of experience. This is particularly visible in the structures of armed forces in the West. Being moved down to a lower position from a higher one, stepping down as a commander to work in the solitude of one's office is not a problem. Moving down to become a commander is quite normal in the West.

[Lukaszewski] How do you see the Ordnance and Equipment Supply Department from the point of view of your previous position?

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[Grzedzinski] This is a MON department that serves the needs of the Polish Armed Forces. It is not easy to meet all of the expectations, mainly because money is spent differently in Poland from the way it is in the West. In the West, the prevailing practice is to purchase good equipment at the lowest possible price. In Poland there is a third requirement, that the equipment be of domestic production. There are positive examples, which is to say that some of the domestic companies are in very good condition. Yet there are also examples that illustrate that the arms industry is facing huge difficulties.

[Lukaszewski] What is your basic assumption upon taking on new duties? What lies ahead and what do you want to achieve?

[Grzedzinski] I intend to set certain mechanisms in place that would allow me to enter partner relations with representatives of the arms industry, those who are offering us their products. I want all of our partners to understand that we are functioning within the framework of a specific system. We should not spend our money lightly. We should receive the highest quality product, even if we do have to think twice before spending a single zloty. We are currently making an effort to plan several years ahead, not just one. Annual purchase orders no longer meet the requirements of the dynamically changing reality.

Poland: Weekly Reveals New Details About Oleksy Case

WS1403124896 Warsaw NIE in Polish 14 Mar 96 No 11, p 1

[Article by Marek Baranski: "Olin Kicks the Bucket, or About Oleksy's Innocence"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It has suddenly become very quiet around the Oleksy "spy" case, in contrast to the earlier uproar over it. The wizards from Rakowiecka [Warsaw street where UOP headquarters is located] have suddenly stopped caring about publicity. As recently as yesterday, they would tell reporters incredible stories about the operational game on Majorca with [intelligence service officer] Zacharski and some chick disguised as an agent starring in it. As recently as yesterday they leaked like a broken pipe, and suddenly it is all quiet—not a single word about Oleksy or Russky spies.

On 18 January 1996, with regard to the Oleksy case, we wrote that, apart from Alganov, about whom everybody knew at that time, there was another Russian. It was the other man who was the primary source of information for Zacharski, or a "personal source," as [former Interior Minister] Milczanowski called him, while explaining to journalists that the Office of State Protection [UOP] had not shadowed Oleksy but had learned about his "treason" by peeping at Russian spies hanging around Poland.

Zacharski, in turn, activated his contact with the Russkies and learned that, when Alganov was about to leave Poland, he told his successor to "say hello from Volodya" to Oleksy. Zacharski interpreted this unequivocally as a password between spies, even though Volodya is simply Alganov's first name and not a pseudonym. Let us imagine, however, how an imagination like Walesa's must have freaked out when he was told about this.

Another success of Zacharski was the purchase of a handwritten note from Alganov's successor, who had already become an acquaintance of our ace and his tennis partner [Oleksy] (not as much for playing as for recording because Zacharski would take his colleague to the Energetyka courts and UOP recorded their chats held at the net).

In the 18 January issue, No. 3/96, of NIE we wrote the following:

Zacharski had yet another colleague who, too, was probably a Russian Embassy employee. It has not been ruled out that Alganov knew about him, although Zacharski thought he did not. Most likely the stranger provided the most important evidence in the entire case—a handwritten note, which was by no means written by Oleksy, however! It does not bear any identification marks such as date, number, call number, description of classification, or signature. (...)

It apparently contains Oleksy's pseudonym and report that he handed over some secret information. This sentence is crossed out, however, so only the devil knows what this means. Although we have not managed to learn what this report was about, we are skeptical.

We were right not to believe anything the morons from UOP said. Now we know what Yakimishin [mentioned earlier in item as "another colleague" of Zacharski] (because it was most likely him) sold Zacharski.

First, the note is written in Russian.

Second, it does not bear any of the aforementioned traits (signatures, numbers, etc.) that would make it a document.

Third, ATTENTION! ATTENTION!: The UOP aces translated it in such a manner that it seemed to them that Jozio [Oleksy] handed over a secret UOP document on state security to the Russkies.

For a translation from a foreign language into ours to have the weight of evidence, it must be done by a

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professional translator. And the Prosecutor's Office did hire such a translator. He, in turn, translated the portion that the morons from UOP unanimously deemed a nail in the coffin in the following way:

"It is unlikely that Oleksy had any access to the secret report on state security."

For our so-called special services, this is such a shame that it can be explained only by debility mixed with mongolism or a conspiracy that envisioned that the entire affair would not go beyond the area of propaganda and the press and would never become an object of a prosecutor's investigation because it would be Walesa and Milczanowski who would judge, and [public television chief] Walendziak would announce it as something in which to believe.

All of the morons from UOP unanimously emphasize that their conviction of Oleksy's guilt is based on their own, UOP's, translation from Russian into Polish, which, as it proves, was false. Probably they still do not know that the translation is erroneous. At this moment, they are certainly in shock while reading this text, and their jaws are dropping.

UOP claims that Oleksy met with a Russky spy as far back as when when he was Sejm marshal and when Czempinski [former UOP chief] warned him that his acquaintance played a double role in Poland. UOP apparently received this information from its informer installed in the world of politics. This appeared from notes handed over to the Prosecutor's Office by UOP. An intelligent prosecutor, however, deduced who the informer of the political police was and summoned him for an interrogation. This gentleman owned up to cooperating with UOP, stating that he had indeed said that Oleksy met with the same Russkie on whom UOP kept an eye, but that the last time he met with him was some two years ago.

We were the fly on the wall when Czempinski learned at the Prosecutor's Office that yet another piece of primary evidence against Oleksy had broken into smithereens. So, please do not look for any secret plots that forced this "excellent general" to resign. The "professionalism" of the services that the Interior Ministry propaganda machine ranks with the Mosad and the BND [German Federal Intelligence Service] and only slightly below the CIA, the professionalism we presented above is sufficient reason to simply fire Czempinski. According to the press, however, Czempinski resigned as a victim of the leftists' greed for power and in the atmosphere of suppositions that it would be much easier for Oleksy's buddies to stifle the entire scandal.

NIE warns everybody who would like to cooperate with UOP: For the sake of your security, do not do that. You will never be sure whether some idiot will copy your documents or take note of a conversation with you in such a manner that an intelligent receiver would not guess whether the talk was about you or someone else. "Tadeusz [not further identified]," from UOP's note about the Oleksy case, was lucky that only the Polish Prosecutor's Office identified him and that he was exposed only in NIE, but we do not reveal true names.

It is known why Walesa and Milczanowski and then television, GAZETA WYBORCZA, ZYCIE WARSZAWY, SUPER EXPRESS, and WPROST were able to make a stick of such shit with which to hit Oleksy and the left. However, why did Zacharski, an officer who was awarded the Cross of Valor for being thrown into a U.S. slammer, as I myself remember, gladly take upon himself the role of the organizer of this row? Thwarted ambitions are the most likely explanation. After all, Zacharski did everything possible to become chief of the prime minister's office when Oleksy became prime minister. Oleksy turned him down. UOP snooped around Oleksy, Miller [current minister of cabinet], and Kwasniewski all the time and looked for dirt on them that Walesa could use to destroy his opponents. Zacharski offered Oleksy as the main dish.

"I will teach this bald prick a lesson," he said. Because he was not alone when he said this, I am sure that the witness to these effusions, too, has already been cross-examined by meticulous prosecutor Gorzkiewicz.

We have peeked into the brain of Slawomir Gorzkiewicz, prosecutor of the Warsaw Military District Prosecutor's Office. Basically one thought has been whirling there for quite a while: What am I supposed to do with this shit? They will chop off my head if I say that the case can only be dismissed.

According to our knowledge of the matter, this is exactly what all those who pushed Oleksy into the trap count on: They count on his uncertainty or perhaps fear of condemnation by the biased press, which warned Gorzkiewicz immediately after he was assigned to the case, that the scandal over Oleksy would trail him for the rest of his life. UOP, the Union of Freedom, both Krols, Bugaj, Borusewicz [opposition politicians], policewoman Pietrzyk—the Sejm special commission chief—Senator Kozlowski, Milczanowski, and the rest of those who shattered the prime minister's career in the light of television cameras will use any hesitation on the part of Prosecutor Gorzkiewicz and any restriction thrust upon him by the need to protect state secrets

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to undermine his credibility, to sow doubt among the public, and to indicate that the prosecutor's impartiality is not perfect. After all, such maneuvers can already be seen.

In this situation, Prosecutor Gorzkiewicz has two options. He can tell the truth like a man: Gentlemen, your "proof" is so crude that it fits only in a toilet. For the sake of peace, he can also apply for suspension of Oleksy's parliamentary immunity, interrogate him as a suspect, and only then dismiss the entire case.

The second method is tempting. If Prosecutor Gorzkiewicz throws a written accusation against the former prime minister as a sop to the press, his career will probably develop beautifully, despite the fact that it will later be necessary to clear Oleksy of any guilt and dismiss the case against him. It is Oleksy for whom the second option will have the worst outcome, but nobody has ever cared about his fate anyway.

We do not know what role our text will play in the Warsaw Military District Prosecutor Office's decision-making. While writing it, we had only one intention: to let the public know the truth and thus show the prosecutor that what he will do will become an object of single-minded condemnation by the press. In addition, since it has already been said what the prosecutor cannot reveal, with a clear conscience he will be able to answer the journalists' question—"Is what NIE wrote true?"—in the following way: I neither confirm nor deny it.

Poland: KPN Leader Denies Changes in Party's Leadership

LD1403175196 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1500 GMT 14 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Leszek Moczulski, leader of the Confederation for an Independent Poland [KPN], has denied reports that the leader of this party's parliamentary floor group has been replaced. KPN deputy Wojciech Blasiak had earlier reported that Janina Kraus had become the new chair of the group replacing Krzysztof Krol. The chairman of the confederation also denied reports by a deputy of the party, Adam Slomka, that the party will hold a congress this Saturday.

Poland: Central Bank Head Supports Consolidation of Banks

WS1503095996 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 14 Mar 96 p 9

[Report by "ROM": "NBP President: Consolidation of Banks—Yes, but Wisely"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Consolidation of the Polish banking system is necessary because our banks will have to successfully compete with foreign financial institutions. "It is difficult to oppose consolidation because banks must be stronger," Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz, president of the National Bank of Poland [NBP], said at a news conference in Katowice yesterday. However, we will be able to speak about real competition only after Poland joins the EU; then foreign banks will not need a license to begin operations on the Polish market.

"The problem is how to carry out this consolidation process. The initial attempt to merge already privatized banks, especially those where foreign capital had a stake, was rather unfortunate. This might have made market players uncertain and investors more cautious," she stated. "It is a good thing that Sejm deputies decided that only banks that are 100-percent owned by the State Treasury should be consolidated. It is a pity, however, that the government failed to do this by amending one of its ordinances."

Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz believes that there are not many possibilities of "selecting" banks in the consolidation process. "It is too bad that this is happening as a result of administrative decisions because banks launched their own consolidation initiatives and this was ignored," the NBP president believes.

The head of the central bank came to Katowice to commemorate the fifth anniversary of the establishment of the local International School of Banking and Finance. She officially opened the so-called mock dealing room [preceding three words published in English], a hall in which foreign exchange dealers are trained with the help of computer simulation. It is the first such facility in Poland. Participants in the exercises in this room, where equipment had been provided thanks to the aid of the British Know-How Fund, will be taught in conditions identical to those that are found at regular trading rooms—including conversations and other noise.

Poland: Education Minister on School System Reform

WS1303091896 Wroclaw SLOWO POLSKIE in Polish 5 Mar 96 p 3

[Interview with Polish Education Minister Jerzy Wiatr by Antoni Lewandowski; place and date not given: "Review of Textbooks Again"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Lewandowski] Could you please tell us how long the students of primary schools will have to cram on the hydra's nervous system, the structure of the blue jellyfish, or that of the water spider? And I do not mean just biology, but other subjects, too.

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[Wiatr] Teachers are constantly scrambling for the biggest chunk of the syllabus, trying to make their subject the most important. One should end this practice and finally determine what is indispensable and useful to the student and what material he has to master. Today the syllabi aim to acquire encyclopedic knowledge.

[Lewandowski] What should be tackled first today?

[Wiatr] The legislative issues—that is, to conclude the work on amending the Teachers Charter, and the review of textbooks. When it comes to the charter, there is a certain conflict between the reform requirements and the position taken on this matter by the teachers trade unions. However, one cannot coerce teachers into doing something they might regard as detrimental. Such decisions would be disastrous. Poland cannot afford antagonizing the teachers' milieu. This milieu is responsible for educating 8.5 million young Poles. That is why, in a few days, I will hold talks with all teacher trade unions to arrive at some agreement.

Another urgent matter is an expeditious review of the textbooks. Various irregularities have accumulated. We were not prepared to confront a free-market situation. We do not want to introduce censorship and curb a multitude of textbooks published by different publishing houses. The minister, however, has to defend the school against a badly written textbook.

[Lewandowski] Could you please give concrete examples?

[Wiatr] For example, the Ministry of Education cannot recommend any textbooks that contain either substantial errors, holding their authors up to ridicule, or interpretative passages of a propaganda and political nature—for instance, textbooks on contemporary history. It is a well-known fact that there is not a single point of view, both among historians and society, on the 1981 martial law assessment. I know this issue very well because, during the past two years, I headed a Sejm committee that dealt with those events. In the meantime, the history textbooks are being chosen as if they were a propaganda bulletin dating from the underground period during martial law. This can no longer continue. I am not saying that it should be the other way around. I would not allow that to happen.

[Lewandowski] In which direction will the changes in the history textbooks go?

[Wiatr] One should discuss history, presenting various arguments, rather than just talk about it. To me, Pawel Jasienica's books have always been ideal. Our history provided examples where two Poles, both of whom loved Poland, would often face each other, arms in hand, and blood was shed. One should keep their distance and describe the arguments of both parties in those conflicts.

[Lewandowski] You said that one view only should not be dominant at schools. It is well known that you have left-wing views. Will these opinions have any influence on the school syllabus? Or perhaps you have changed your opinion?

[Wiatr] I have changed my opinion to a small extent. I have always regarded myself as a Marxist. I have adopted this philosophy as my own point of view. And I have always approached that way of thinking as an open one. My Marxism is liberal and open to dialogue with others. I have always thought that one should create such conditions so that people of different convictions could cooperate and share responsibility for Poland. I think that these opinions of mine made Prime Minister Cimoszewicz appoint me as minister of education.

[Lewandowski] You said quite clearly that you would not allow one specific view to be presented in the schools. How should one understand that?

[Wiatr] I see it this way. The teacher, because he is the main player, should have the right to present his point of view to the students. On the other hand, it is the duty of the Ministry of Education to provide the teacher with impartial materials. It is obvious that there may be different points of view on the issue. The Ministry of National Education [MEN] exists primarily to defend the teacher against any pressures that could limit his independence. It concerns all teachers. If, for instance, a teacher were persecuted just because he presented a point of view accepted by the church, I would defend that teacher the same way I would defend someone who holds different opinions. If school superintendents and principles do not observe these basic rules of defending all teachers and their right to express independent views, they will have to leave. There will not be any ideological policy or a specific philosophy. This will only be a defense of tolerance and pluralism.

[Lewandowski] We are talking about difficult problems of schools. One of them is the question of tuition fees, which will be introduced first at institutions of higher education. Are you a proponent of tuition fees?

[Wiatr] My view on this issue has been sensationalized. And it was not I who came up with the idea of introducing tuition fees at institutions of higher learning. It has been the rectors of higher institutions who have been making this stipulation for years. If the tuition fees were adopted by the Sejm, students from lower income families would be ruled out. Let us remember, however, that no dramatic change can occur today because the constitutional guarantee of free education is

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still in force. Thus, talking about it is pointless because any change would be questioned by the Constitutional Tribunal. On the other hand, if these matters are settled in the new constitution, two questions will surely be considered: safeguarding the inflow of financial means to the institutions of higher education and unfolding the protective umbrella for not-so-well-to-do young people, who cannot be prevented from graduating.

[Lewandowski] Do you envisage any personnel changes in the educational sector?

[Wiatr] For the time being, I do not envisage any changes, although I cannot rule them out in the future. The ministry, as any other institution, is a living body, and some changes can occur, should they be necessary.

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Slovenia: Handziski, Kacin Welcome U.S. Military Aid

AU1503081696 Skopje MIC in English 14 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] At their meeting yesterday in Ljubljana, Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] and Slovenian Defense Ministers Blagoja Handziski and Jelko Kacin greeted the decision of U.S. President Bill Clinton for military assistance to Macedonia and Slovenia. They both assessed this decision as important for strengthening peace and stability in the region.

At this meeting the cooperation of the two countries in the field of defense was positively assessed. This especially refers to cooperation of Macedonian soldiers in winter conditions in Slovenia, in communication systems and protection of the skies, and within the "Partnership for Peace" program.

Slovenia: Kacin Meets U.S., Italian Envoys on Defense

AU1503094896 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 15 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Defense Minister Jelko Kacin held talks in Ljubljana with U.S. Ambassador Victor Jackovich and U.S. military attache Colonel (Callnay). The talks focused on the memorandum in which U.S. President Clinton states that Slovenia and Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] are meeting the conditions for U.S. military aid. The decision was also made to cooperate further in the defense field in the next three months.

Minister Kacin also met with Italian Ambassador (Spenetti). Kacin informed the ambassador that the Slovene side is examining the Italian proposal on drafting a defense cooperation agreement that also includes the exchange of military attaches.

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Federal

FRY: Milutinovic Meets Delegation of Hague Tribunal

LD1203150296 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1439 GMT 12 Mar 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, March 12 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic on Tuesday [12 March] received a delegation of the international tribunal for war crimes in the former Yugoslavia, led by Deputy Prosecutor Graham Blewitt.

The Foreign Ministry press office said that the talks had focused on cooperation between Yugoslavia and the tribunal based in The Hague.

The delegation is expected to meet with representatives of the Yugoslav judiciary during its visit to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

FRY: Kontic Receives Bulgarian Parliamentary Delegation

LD1203151796 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1433 GMT 12 Mar 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, March 12 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Prime Minister Radoje Kontic on Tuesday [12 March] received a high Bulgarian parliamentary delegation, headed by chairman of National Assembly Blagovest Sendov, federal information secretariat said.

In a friendly talk of some length the two sides positively assessed the relations between the two countries, stressing that there existed exceptional conditions for and mutual interest in their further development.

Kontic very favourably assessed the intensity and results of the Yugoslav-Bulgarian top-level contacts over the past year, pointing out their significance not only for the development of mutual relations but also for the stability of the Balkans as a whole.

Sendov also highly assessed the relations between the two countries, stressing the need of furthering comprehensive cooperation, especially of economic relations.

In a very cordial atmosphere, the two sides showed the congruity of stands towards most of the international issues, especially as regards regional cooperation in the Balkans. They set out the need of Yugoslavia's return in international institutions and organizations at the soonest.

At the talk, the two sides especially emphasized the role of ethnic minorities in the further all-round development of the two neighbouring countries, the statement said.

FRY: Agreement on Restoration of German Pension Payments

LD1303112296 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1000 GMT 13 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Bonn, March 12 (TANJUG)—Germany and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (F.R.Y.) agreed Tuesday [12 March] that as of June 1 the German banks, after a four-year break, would again begin to pay out pensions to the Yugoslav citizens who had once worked in that country.

This agreement was achieved after two-day talks between the two countries' delegations in the German city of Landshut.

Assistant Yugoslav Labour Minister Maksim Korac, who headed the delegation, said in a statement to tanjug that the two sides agreed to enforce the earlier agreement on social insurance signed by the former Yugoslavia and Germany.

Korac said that pensions could be paid out to all 'German pensioners' now living in the territory of the F.R.Y., including the refugees who had once gained the right to German pensions.

Payments operations between Germany and the F.R.Y. were halted by the international community's sanctions against Yugoslavia which were suspended last November by the Dayton peace agreement.

FRY: Phone Company Denies Cutting Lines to Serbs

AU1403190496 Bad Vilbel VESTI in Serbo-Croatian 14 Mar 96 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Engaged Because of Overloading"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Telephone connections with the Serb Republic have not been disconnected and are functioning normally, VESTI has learnt from the German and Yugoslav telecommunication services. Yesterday a great number of readers called the editorial board of VESTI, saying they had been trying to reach some numbers in Banja Luka and Bijeljina without success, so they thought the telephone lines were disconnected.

Officials of the Yugoslav telecommunication service categorically maintain that yesterday there was no major damage, so they assume it was all about overloaded lines, because the telephone exchange in the Serb

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Republic has a small capacity, so overloading can easily occur.

FRY: European Concerns at Ankara Conference Noted

LD1503080296 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0751 GMT 15 Mar 96

["Pool" item by diplomatic editor Zoran Jevdjovic]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, March 14 (TANJUG)—An American-Turkish initiative for an international program of arming and training the Muslim army in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) has recently been assessed by Spanish Foreign Minister Carlos Westendorp as 'the last thing we need.'

This could present the somewhat surprisingly acute yet unanimous reaction by representatives of nearly all the European powers to the U.S. intentions to have the Muslim army armed in order to 'establish a balance' of power and hence, allegedly, guarantee a more lasting peace in the BiH.

Such a balance of power as could be reached through arming and training the army of the Muslim-Croat Federation (MHF) is the subject matter of a conference gathering together forty countries in Ankara on Thursday [14 March].

An equilibrium of fear certainly is something that had been functioning during the cold war period—but under the different circumstances. That was an extorted balance which in no way whatsoever can work as a pattern applicable to the BiH.

If the ultimate goal is a multi-ethnic community within which its two entities—the Serb and the Muslim-Croat—would strive for abating mutual tensions and for cooperation, especially on the economic plane, no one in his right mind would believe that this goal was attainable by arming either side.

American analysts almost invariably explain that this means the administration's concession to the Congress lobby which is inclined to the Muslim government in Sarajevo. This explanation may be right but insufficient to be accepted.

Concerned here is a possibly perilous development from the arming and training one of the parties to the just discontinued civil war in the BiH. The shift to a durable peace, after the atrocious warfare, depends in the first place on the absolutely equal relationship towards all the sides that had been warring until recently.

Such moves simply have to stir up serious concern as may be seen from German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel's asserting he could not understand that the U.S. does have money for arms but not does not have money for the construction of the devastated country.

Bearing in mind that Germany is the closest American ally in Europe, one may infer how firm and repelling is the attitude of the European countries towards the moves that are potentially capable of rekindling the conflict in the immediate vicinity of the European states.

France has risen against the U.S. ideas, as its Foreign Ministry representative specified that his country was giving priority to the reconstruction and development, not to the arming of the crisis region.

Moscow refused to participate in the Ankara conference which should promote the idea of arming and training and raise 800 million dollars planned for the cost of the entire project.

Russia simultaneously decided to lift the embargo on arms deliveries to the area of former Yugoslavia, which was interpreted as the warning that Moscow would not be indifferent and would not so easily cede the arms market to its western competitors.

At the American Congress, dilemmas do not cease as regards the Sarajevo Muslim government's stance towards the sojourn of Iranian instructors and Mujahedin. The republican leader Bob Dole, who advocates military assistance to be extended to the MHF, says that the presence of Iranian intelligence members and soldiers in the BiH is jeopardizing the future of this state as a democratic and pluralist state in Europe.

In the end, the question remains as to what influence will be exerted by the Ankara conference and its results on the disarmament talks now underway in Vienna, where the until yesterday confronted sides are negotiating on the confidence buildup measures and disarmament, including reductions of their military potentials down to the proportions foreseen by the Dayton peace agreement.

For the BiH, the Vienna negotiations account for a lengthier and more painful, but a more certain, road when the safeguarding of a lasting peace is concerned. Such a peace is the best interest not only of the BiH but also of the entire region and, naturally, of Europe as a whole.

FRY: Army Chief of Staff Visits Troops in West

LD1403183196 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1732 GMT 14 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, March 14 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Army Chief of Staff Gen. Momcilo Perisic on Thursday [14 March] visited units

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in western Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav Army General Staff said in a statement.

Commander of the Drina Division Maj.-Gen. Tomislav Obradov informed the guests, including First Army Commander Lt.-Gen. Dragoljub Ojdanic, about the results in the development of combat readiness.

Gen. Perisic praised the overall situation and achievements of the Drina division in the complex security and economic conditions and spoke about the main tasks in the next period.

The statement said that Gen. Perisic had also met with members of the Drina division in the Valjevo and Sabac garrisons and informed them about the current situation in the world, region and country and the Yugoslav Army.

FRY: Worker Believes Plant Smelting Radioactive Material

AU1203141996 Bad Vilbel VESTI in Serbo-Croatian 12 Mar 96 p 25

[Unattributed report: "Colleagues Do Not Believe in Poisonous Brandy"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Belgrade Institute for Protection at Work is expected to announce today the results of an investigation carried out at the Petar Drapsin steelworks in Mladenovac. Then it will certainly be clearer whether the cause of death of five workers who died suddenly in the period from 2 February to 8 March is some sort of poisonous substance, gas or methanol that the workers had consumed during work.

An autopsy has been performed by forensic experts at the Belgrade Faculty of Medicine on the body of Nebojsa Deljanin, the latest victim of the strange epidemic at this plant. The results are expected soon. [passage omitted]

As VESTI has discovered, only after the third death on 12 February did the management of Petar Drapsin plant sound the alarm, and call the head of the Institute for Work Medicine, Dr. Zoran Sekularac. He concluded that these cases are not only happening at this plant, but have also occurred in other plants recently. In any case, workers have been warned to avoid consuming liquors of questionable quality. [passage omitted]

Pain in Lungs

Miroljub Milisavljevic, smelter of aluminum radiators, does not believe that the cause of death of his colleagues is liquor. [passage omitted]

Milosavljevic, who complains about pain in his lungs, adds that in the steelworks' furnaces all sorts of things are being smelted, so even a piece of explosive happens to get into them. "Already at one and half meters above ground a smoke screen arises, and metal dust is deposited on all our tables," Miroljub says.

Dragan Gajic, a toolmaker, agrees with his story, saying that he is convinced that radioactive materials are being smelted in the plant. However, unofficially, some executive managers in the plant deny the stories about radiation. [passage omitted]

FRY: Article Says Money, Jobs for Leftists Only

96BA0182A Belgrade EKONOMSKA POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 29 Jan 96 p 11

[Article by V. Karakasevic: "Pileup on the Left"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Money and jobs are on the left. For quite a long time now, this message has been quietly making the rounds of Yugoslavia. If you want an import or export deal, a good place and commission as intermediary in the chain of domestic trade or supplying raw materials and production supplies to domestic industry, a concession to participate in building parts of the infrastructure, inexpensive credit, an outstanding building lot, protection from the financial police, or the police in general...you have to be close to the left. If not actually an active member of any of the parties of the declared "left-wing" orientation, then at least a sponsor of their party activity.

In the foyers of the chambers in which young Socialists are enrolled under a pink Leninist glow, young people are told in a conspiratorial whisper that this membership card is the only thing that can guarantee them a scholarship, employment, or promotion.

The left has no room for stronger development of the private sector either in its programs or in its soul. But those private operators who are leftward-inclined and who have built their rich and successful enterprises and companies precisely on that inclination serve as an example of how private initiative can be in harmony with the system.

Verbal messages, hints, and specific experiences are only an extension of the written messages concerning moral and political fitness from the time when membership in the League of Communists of (the Socialist Federal Republic of) Yugoslavia guaranteed easier and quicker passage, both to special benefits and privileges and also to quite ordinary things such as employment or right of tenancy. Both then and now, belonging to the left took the place of competition of personal virtues and abilities and of competition of ideas and programs. The pileup on the left also confirms continuity of the

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mentality. A lack of talent or business acumen is offset by party enrollment, and then doors somehow open of themselves. Everything goes much more easily. But an equal inclination toward the left is shown by people who are truly skilled at business or who have other talents in both the public and private sectors, individuals who have accepted the only road to success as a lesser evil than failure. Everyone's money is clean to them, and the end justifies the means.

There is more and more talk about a new election. And while the opposition is straining to pool its ideological and financial poverty, a deadly slogan is circulating through Yugoslavia: Money and jobs are on the left!

Serbia

Serbia: Hague Court Allowed To Open Belgrade Office

AU1403162196 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 14 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Graham Blewitt, deputy of The Hague Tribunal's prosecutor, has been visiting Belgrade. The visit by the Hague Tribunal representative in the last four days has been very successful and has produced positive results. Graham Blewitt has held talks with Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic and Justice Ministry officials.

They have agreed to open a Hague Tribunal office in Belgrade in the near future. Negotiations are currently under way about the appointment of liaison officers in Belgrade. The Hague Tribunal is intensively collecting data on war crimes in which Serbs were victims.

Serbia: Minister, Russian Delegation Discuss Power Industry

LD1403225896 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2140 GMT 14 Mar 96

["Ecopool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, March 14 (TANJUG)—Serbian Minister for the Mining, Fuel and Power Industries Dragan Kostic had a talk here on Thursday [14 March] with a delegation of the Russian Federation's electric power industry about promotion of cooperation in the electric power industry.

The Serbian Information Ministry said in an announcement that the talk highlighted the immediate tasks in strengthening cooperation between the two electric power systems and in the development of electric power projects in Serbia.

The Russian and Serbian delegations, headed by Vitaliy Gorin and Minister Kostic respectively, conferred also about the possibilities of exchanging and marketing electric power and about other questions related to the two electric power systems.

The Russian delegation proposed well-coordinated work between the relevant industries of Serbia and Russia and those of the neighbouring countries, the announcement said.

Serbia: Serbian Radical Party Leader Plans Bijelina Rally

LD1403180396 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1604 GMT 14 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 14 Mar (SRNA)—Vojislav Seselj, chairman of the Serbian Radical Party, announced today that a large patriotic rally will be held in Bijeljina on 23 March.

At a news conference in Belgrade he said that "great efforts were needed in the attempt to consolidate the [Bosnian] Serb Republic, at least what is left of it, because certain factors are attempting to sow discard within it." [passage omitted]

Serbia: Methods for Increasing SPS Membership Viewed

96BA0189A Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 16 Feb 96 pp 10-12

[Article by Srboljub Bogdanovic: "Everyone in the SPS's Campaign: Road to High Society"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The opposition appears to be counting on coming to power by biological means, since SPO [Serbian Renewal Movement] and DS [Democratic Party] sympathizers are much younger than SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia] supporters. That is of course nonsense.*

Everyone is struggling to the best of their knowledge and ability to take over power or to remain in power. According to information recently released by SPS officials and confirmed to NIN by Aleksandar Rastovic, the vice chairman of the Young Socialists, around 30,000 new members have joined that party over the course of two and a half months. Of that number, around 10,000 are young people who will first be tempered on the junior varsity team—the Young Socialists.

State television, of course, is delighted with this happy turn of events. So much enthusiasm and euphoria is exuded by TV Journal over the admission of hundreds of new members of the Socialist Party that this already resembles a preelection campaign, even though such a campaign is still not under way. If you try to find out why all of this is necessary right now, you will be told that this relates to the natural need of people to

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join the party that offers a better life and that has also acquired a reputation for defending national interests and for pursuing a consistent peacemaking policy, and so on, all of which you already knew without asking.

After all, here is what Rastovic says: "There are various reasons why people choose us. The first is our program, which is the program of the moderate left, and in it we emphasize those parts that relate to peace, solidarity, social justice, and equality in ownership relations. The second reason is the consistency of our peacemaking policy. The third reason is our leadership—here I am thinking about the leadership of the Young Socialists, which is committed to solving the problems of young people through concrete actions. The fourth is the fact that the anticommunist wave has subsided and young people have realized that the so-called democracy offered by the international community is actually calamity and devastation, plunder.... Finally, the fifth reason why people are joining our party is the personality of the party chief, his reputation inside the country, and the fact that President Milosevic is an indispensable figure on the international scene."

Without questioning the fact that the large-scale expansion of membership is beneficial to the SPS, especially because of the marketing effects, it might nevertheless be fitting to wonder whether this benefit is in fact so great that it would be worth so much effort. Allegedly, President Milosevic has personally stipulated that the SPS should have a million members before the party congress, and Ivica Dacic has confirmed that goal, although without linking it to Slobodan Milosevic. By the way, if the people in the ruling party are really aiming to achieve a figure of one million, then it is obvious from the figures that they themselves are releasing that they are going to fall short. Generally speaking, this is in no way reminiscent of the bond campaign for Serbian rebirth. The people have gained a plaything, together with a party apparatus; the benefit is not great, but it is a benefit that will certainly not be harmful. In a month or two, all that will left of this are more or less worthless bonds or, in this case, party membership booklets.

Nevertheless, says Srecko Mihajlovic of the Institute for Social Sciences, "The benefit of this to the SPS is great. Party identification is one of the several main factors of voters' electoral orientation. There is a 90 percent probability that our voters will vote for the party with which they have identified. This is true both of the SPS and of the opposition parties. In this regard, it is not even that important whether the voter has formally joined the party—what is important is that he regards himself and has declared himself to be its sympathizer, or member. That explains why parties are generally interested in expanding their membership."

Speaking to the Person

Thus, Srecko Mihajlovic believes that the main point is that an expansion of membership also means an automatic expansion of the electorate in practice. The holder of an SPS membership booklet, even if he is completely politically inactive, will vote for the SPS, even if the SPS does not meet some of his expectations, simply because in some sense he will feel like a part of that political corpus.

"The right question is not why the SPS is doing this, but rather why the other parties are not," says Srecko Mihajlovic.

Regardless of the fact that the campaign to expand party membership is very broadly based, the emphasis is clearly being placed on the youngest structure, i.e., the Young Socialists. This is a clear indication that even though they will not admit it, the SPS's weakest base of support is in that part of the populace. Certain results are discernible. A little while ago, Srbobran Brankovic of the Institute for Political Studies talked in the pages of NIN about how even though the overall ratings of the ruling party are stagnating, a growth in the popularity of the SPS is noticeable among the youngest bloc of voters. A similar trend is indicated by a "Forum NIN" survey, in which Slobodan Milosevic proves to be the most popular politician among those under the age of 35, albeit by only a small lead.

"Among the very young, there are many people who are completely outside of politics. Our institute conducted a survey about what the ideal political party would look like and what it should stand for. The survey showed that on the whole, a voter often votes for the SPS even if his political leanings are closer to what the opposition parties stand for. This is because the opposition does not speak to the person, the individual, and fails to appeal to him, unlike the SPS. The opposition appears to be counting on coming to power by biological means, given the fact that SPO and DS sympathizers are much younger than SPS supporters. That is of course nonsense," says Srecko Mihajlovic.

SPS Transfusion

The opposition parties are calling this campaign one of pressure, or more often deception, by the ruling party, in an effort to show that this SPS policy will not bring electoral results. Most of all here they are counting on the elections being secret and on the fact that no one is obligated to vote according to the color of his party ID card.

With increasing frequency, the opposition parties and opposition press are beginning to allege abuses and

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manipulation surrounding the "Everyone in the SPS" drive. The best known case of this would appear to be the one described in the publication SRPSKA REC, where it was reported that a group of workers from Lazarevac went to Belgrade to give blood but ended up at the SPS City Committee, in front of television cameras reporting on "a group of SPS activities who are voluntarily giving blood."

A similar methodology was also used in a case (cited by the Democratic Party in Pirot) in which schoolchildren were bused to Belgrade for a concert held in conjunction with a Young Socialists convention. It will prove to be the case that not even the performers at the concert, and least of all the members of the audience, were informed in advance that this concert would have any connection with politics. The Pirot schoolchildren were at the concert, but only after they filled seats at the Young Socialists convention at the Sava Center. In view of this, the vigilant Democrats in Pirot denounced yet another Socialist impropriety. In exposing the manner in which young people are being registered in the SPS, they cite the case of a boxing club where the trainer and members of management distributed Socialist Party application forms to the young members of that club. This case came to light thanks to one boxer who resisted the group registration in the SPS.

Way Over There

The universal explanation that is offered, or with which, perhaps, the opposition consoles itself, is that the main motivation of the vast majority of new SPS registrants is that they are hoping for ("the Socialists have promised them") some sort of personal benefit, in the form of easier and better job prospects, loans, and similar practical privileges. The above example noted by the DS in Pirot even goes so far as to quote new members who say that they joined the SPS because they were promised a plane trip to Greece. Based on everything that we know about the country in which we live, such manipulation is not only possible, but even probable, especially away from the capital, but it clearly does not constitute the greatest deviation of our political scene. It is obvious to any reasonable person that even the powerful SPS is not powerful enough to provide to each of its members even a fraction of what he would like to have, even if this were at the expense of nonmembers of the SPS. The actions of these new SPS members are motivated more by the desire not to be discriminated against by others who are "members" than by the idea of some sort of concrete assistance from the party. Those who are "activated by greed"—i.e., by malicious intentions—do not go to the SPS, but rather choose a shortcut: They go straight to the JUL [Yugoslav United Left].

Srecko Mihajlovic also thinks that as far as this is concerned, the ordinary membership of any party has nothing to hope for: "This type of parliamentary democracy that exists in our civilization requires a certain number of party activists, but it does not require any particular activity by the broadest membership. No special conditions are required in order to join a party. An individual cannot expect anything from his party; moreover, he is unimportant to it."

The practice of mass enrollment in the party in power is reminiscent of (among other things) the days when an ID card from what was then the only party was, as it were, a precondition for occupying any prominent position in society. There is no doubt that the SPS, like any other party in its position, will give preferential treatment to its members whenever it has the opportunity to do so, at the expense of nonmembers. Perhaps that is a bad thing, but it is not abnormal. The other, greater danger—perhaps the most profound danger of this entire matter—is that through this mass enrollment, the party apparatus is closing itself off in the same way as in the former, Titoist Yugoslavia. A mass party is being created, which is then in a position to assume all state functions and thus turn us into a (non)partisan society, which is the declared political goal of the duet of rulers in Serbia. Naturally, that would presuppose the complete marginalization of all alternative political forces in the country, which does not seem possible, but the question is to what extent those enslaved by the single-party ideology are aware of that.

Nevertheless, it is also possible to regard a connection between the utterly normal and legitimate campaign by the ruling party to quickly expand its membership and ambitions to achieve total control as exaggerated. In discussing this, it is certainly instructive to bear in mind the viewpoint of Slobodan Milosevic, expressed in an interview with LE MONDE of Paris on 14 July 1989 (the 200th anniversary of the French Revolution), in which he talks about "nonpartisan pluralism" as a type of structure toward which he is personally inclined. No knowledge of French is necessary to monitor the daily criticism of the multiparty system expressed by the president's wife.

Diligent Siege

Like it or not, the subject of mass party registration has become an extremely topical subject in relations between the JUL and the SPS. This especially since the JUL, as a separate organization, has its own methods for acquiring influence which are less predicated on the

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mass nature of its membership and much more on the creation of a well-organized structure on the level of the political and financial elite. In this regard, extensive use is made of connections and contacts established back in the days of the "previous" Yugoslavia. The JUL's strength is attributed to its good organization and connections on the level of business administrators and technomanagers at the highest levels, which is the sphere in which this leftist movement is acquiring influence. Naturally, this also brings with it enormous financial potential.

The director of one (state-owned) construction firm reveals to NIN that the JUL methods for establishing business connections are in fact rather subtle. "You go to the closest branch of the JUL and explain to them your firm's program, your plans and ideas and the type of contact in which you are interested. You need not even mention politics, so to speak. You can count on your problems, i.e., your firm's problems, vanishing after that, or at least diminishing substantially. Getting jobs, loans—everything changes." This makes it clearer how and why it is that the most influential JUL adherents are not in fact members of it.

However, simply saying that a project needs state coverage "from below" (by the SPS) and "from above" (which is the role of the JUL) would be an oversimplification and would overlook the activities that the JUL itself is undertaking to expand its membership.

Three Sacred Things

It is often the JUL's practice not to announce its promotions publicly, but rather to get its activists to each bring a few acquaintances along. This tactic has numerous advantages: First, it requires an active approach by the membership, and second, it provides direct contact between the party and its potential sympathizers. An investigation ("snooping," some would say) proves the accuracy of the belief that among JUL supporters there are many for whom this was an act of desperation in their attempt to do something for themselves. However, there is also an interesting social phenomenon that essentially has no direct connection with politics. It turns out that younger JUL members have not opted for that party because of ideology or any material advantages; rather, that was a way for them to secure for themselves some form of social status. Free of all illusions and ideals, they have chosen the JUL simply because that well-situated movement seemed a good way for them to elevate that social status to a higher level. Practically speaking, their attitude toward the political organization does not differ essentially from, say, their attitude toward a cultural and artistic society.

The JUL appears to be aware of the fact that it is not predestined to capture as much power in the elections as it would like. The likely reason for this lies with certain internal contradictions of this movement, not the least of which is the fact that it recently branded those who have gotten rich over the past three years as obvious war profiteers, while the JUL itself includes a number of Serbian nouveaux riches. According to one rough scenario, the JUL—whatever it used to be—should reinstall itself in the Socialist Party and continue to manage the state in the form of the SPS, but in its own, JUL-like essence. The sort of hybrid that this would entail is best illustrated by a statement by one prominent JUL member who is also a well-known soccer coach, who shouted at one of the promotions, "We have three sacred things: the land, the national anthem, and President Milosevic."

Of course, the opposition is an obstacle to this. Not because it is wise or strong, but rather because it is attracting too many supporters, and especially because all the opposition's supporters are actually not in favor of the opposition as much as they are against the government. This polarity is the greatest factor of political instability in Serbia.

That is why it is essential to bring the electorate into one's own camp in one way or another, and that will be achieved best by registering as many people as possible (even all of them, if possible) as members of the ruling party. Of course, this method too has certain shortcomings, represented by the fact that a mass party slapped together like this has poor cohesion and lacks solid discipline, and theoretically there is an increased risk that some dissident wing will emerge within the party. Apparently, some thought has been given to this, so that the internal elections that are currently being held within the SPS bear the hallmark of control by the party leadership. The candidate lists for local leadership positions are drawn up in Belgrade, while the role of the party rank and file has been reduced to accepting or rejecting them in their entirety. NASA BORBA reveals that this type of election is not even in keeping with the SPS bylaws, but as that daily newspaper reports, the SPS response to that is that "elections are an internal party matter." If they are, they are.

In the context of all this, the reception accorded the new Socialists represents a clear makeup job by the media, a publicity stunt intended to preserve euphoria, culminating in the congress in early March. It is difficult to judge the quality of this campaign in terms of marketing. The newly admitted (young) Socialists on the small screen use the same phrases that one could have heard 20 years ago during SSO [Socialist Youth League] and SKJ [League of Communists of Yugoslavia] member-

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ship drives, which could generate opposition among the people. However, Srecko Mihajlovic says that it is practically impossible in such cases to judge what is and what is not a marketing success. As regards the publicity effect, Mihajlovic says that the educated populace is usually taken as a yardstick. However, this disregards the fact that methods that could be completely ineffective with the educated part of the populace could be productive among the less educated.

One must believe that even though this media campaign will not essentially change anything, the Socialists do know what they are doing. Their methods are every bit as practical as their political goals are irrational. The fact that for quite some time now they have been saying without letup that they are the best party because they have defended national interests and pursued a consistent peacemaking policy shows that they know exactly where they have messed up the most.

Serbia: Relations Between SPS, Opposition Discussed

96BA0185A Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 9 Feb 96 pp 15-16

[Article by Batic Bacevic: "Political Scene in Serbia: Three-Sided Opposition"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Seselj called for an oath, Draskovic regarded this as stupidity, and the democrats called for a spirit of tolerance.*

The vice president of the republic Assembly, Predrag Zdravkovic, watched with amazement about a hundred opposition representatives in front of the Serbian parliament building last Thursday. The forward-looking Zdravkovic asked in disbelief what the representatives would do in the Assembly. The same day, Assembly reporters were able to observe quite a number of uniformed persons in the halls and other premises of the Assembly, nervous officials, and numerous closed doors in the building of the supreme legislative body of this state. Although they were confused, the reporters did not ask too many questions.

The representatives for whom the majority of the citizens had spoken did not even have the right to such amazement. After five years of being acquainted with views on the world of the ruling party, they were able to pose almost the identical question: Indeed, what will we do in such an assembly?

The Bottom of Things

Although the calling together of a parallel parliament and its arrogant obstructionism could be characterized as still more proof of the political immaturity of the government and the opposition in Serbia, somewhat more serious observers of the unhappy relationship between the regime and the opposition are convinced that, after these events, the two poles of the Serbian political scene will get to the bottom of things.

The government has displayed the most convincing proof so far that a united, one-party parliament is its favorite and that its tolerance up to now of the opposition scene is not too pleasant. The opposition, after the fairly degrading relationship of the regime to it, would have to realize that a far more serious, but also more radical, political challenge stands before it. Therefore, the two parties will be getting to the bottom of things up to the coming elections; although it is not known when they will be held, all parties are preparing for them as if they will be tomorrow.

The very opposition figures who can praise themselves for great experience and fairly modest results consider that the decision of the Socialists to close the doors to the Serbian opposition is only one more in a series of their haughty, overbearing acts. The Western world, according to the same interpretations, informed Milosevic that only the implementation of the Dayton papers interests it and, in return, the president of Serbia has resolute hands on the internal political scene. In keeping with the rich experience of cooperation and respect with an exceptionally stable, peaceful, and nondemocratic regime in Latin America, the "American administrator" for the SRJ [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia], Warren Christopher, received guarantees that an informational center in Pristina and an office of the Hague court in Belgrade will be opened, but he didn't get very excited because of the closing of the short and poor story about parliamentarism in the far-off Balkan land.

The majority of the opposition figures, however, believe that the Socialists are frightened by the appearance of a more active and more united performance by the opposition. The preelection Socialist campaign, in which several thousand new, farsighted, and honest young people are joining the SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia] every day (on the basis of leafing through the government press, some diligent opposition figures confirmed that 200,000 members have joined the SPS in the past two months), and increasingly greater pressure on "nonsocialist elements" in the interior indicate that the ruling party is not finding things easy.

"They have lost their compass. When the Socialist Party was strong and self-confident, they acted ignorantly toward the opposition. They permitted meetings of the opposition in 1991 and 1992, they even broadcast them on state television, and they wouldn't even think of the prohibition of TV broadcasts of Assembly meetings. They apprehended us radicals last year only for strolling

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along the streets, and now they are going further. The Socialists themselves are uncertain and frightened about their existence; none of them know what the day is bringing and what the night is, and many are convinced that Slobodan Milosevic has not been making all those decisions for a long time, but that his wife is leading the party," believes the vice president of the Serbian Radical Party, Tomislav Nikolic.

But, although it is difficult to understand the moves of the ruling party, it is not much easier to comprehend the actions of the "united opposition." After several noisy statements on unity, a parallel parliament, and passing laws, a slow withdrawal of views has occurred. After the dismissal of the republic parliament and the closing of the doors, the opposition would have to accept at least two conditions that the leader of the Democratic Party of Serbia, Vojislav Kostunica, cited about two years ago: no cooperation with Socialists (this time it has spread to the JUL [Yugoslav United Left] and the New Democracy), and no attacks on each other.

Pressure

According to the opinion of representatives of opposition parties, the greatest reservation toward such an idea, which the leader of the SRS [Serbian Radical Party], Vojislav Seselj, recently repeated, is expressed by Vuk Draskovic. According to NASA BORBA, he replied that this is not acceptable, posing a hypothetical question: "What if the Socialists decide to replace Milosevic? I will vote for that with both hands."

If this joking tone is ignored, the conviction of other opposition leaders that the idea of an "oath" is not acceptable for the SPO [Serbian Renewal Movement] remains, because the SPO figures on disappointed Socialists among whom "disappointed" representatives of the New Democracy could also be included, since it is assumed that this small but important party will leave the government before the elections and again assume a place in the first ranks of the opposition.

Representatives of the SPO, however, believe that a united opposition can be created only on the basis of organized uniform goals, assuming that this party best understands those goals. SPO spokesman Ivan Kovacevic says:

"We expect that all political parties that are for the democratic and European manner of organizing society will find themselves on one election list, and we are convinced that this list will bring victory at the coming elections. As to the relationship between international society and the ruling party, I think the West has concluded that pressure on Milosevic always bears fruit, but that this pressure will be decided on only after the peace process is completed in Bosnia."

On the other hand, the radicals believe that the Socialist performance is most useful for their party interests, because Milosevic's new approaches to the world (cooperation with The Hague or a dialogue with Kosovo Albanians) will inevitably gain a few more points for them in the preelection tests of public opinion. A good part of the opposition does not oppose this decision of the radicals, since they have received clear messages from the West that it will not recognize any united, democratic opposition if the Serbian radicals are also in it. Thus the paradoxical possibility remains of creating several "united opposition lists" (and all against the communists).

Triviality

These lists could include the SPO with several small parties (the Civil Alliance, the "Vojvodina Bloc," the Democratic Center, some minority parties), the Democratic Alliance led by Djindjic and Kostunica, and united Serbian radicals. In the struggle for a united opposition, which regularly yields great benefit in the voting body, the Democrats have the smallest reserves for now. "For the DS [Democratic Party], the joint approach of the opposition represents an optimal variation, and we expect that the parties that still have reservations will realize that they will not lose what is called specific program characteristics. We also think that beginning difficulties cannot discourage the opposition, since a whole year of preparations for the election is still before us, and possibilities still exist for finding a compromise. For us it is most important that a spirit of tolerance again prevail in opposition ranks," says DS Secretary Liljana Lucic.

The question from which all ascents and falls of a united opposition have moved in the last several years sounds fairly simple: How to convert a significant number of votes into a majority of delegate positions. For fairly strange reasons, opposition leaders have considered this question too trivial and have devoted full attention to the constituent assembly, monarchy, and republic, to the appearance of a future, domestic Serbia or of a brighter future. Future elections will probably take place at the beginning of next winter, and some opposition figures foresee the possibility that local elections will be scheduled before them that will serve the SPS as a trial balloon. In any case, the opposition would have to return by then to its beginning, trivial problem and, after five years of a poetic-political involvement, respond to the question of how, with the help of the votes of the majority of citizens, to come to power.

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Montenegro

Montenegro: Bosnian Serb Refugees Entering via Herzegovina

AU1403150196 Bad Vilbel VESTI in Serbo-Croatian 14 Mar 96 p 5

[Unattributed report: "Into Serbia Through the Back Door"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Some of the refuge-seeking Serb families from Sarajevo and its suburbs, who have been denied entry to Serbia, are still managing to get into the FRY, that is, Serbia, via Montenegro, MONTENAFAKS news agency reports, drawing upon unofficial sources.

The agency claims that the refugees are passing across the Herzegovina-Montenegrin border in trucks loaded with their furniture. At the Department for Refugees in the Government of Montenegro nobody was able to confirm this information, claiming that they had data only on refugees who report to the Department.

Vojvodina

Vojvodina: Hungarians Mark 1848 Revolution Anniversary

LD1403233296 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 2100 GMT 14 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Association of Vojvodina Hungarians [UVM] held a festive commemoration [of the 15 March 1848 Hungarian revolution] in Stara Moravica [Bacskossuthfalva]. It was attended by Gabor Gellert Kis, chairman of the National Assembly's Human Rights and Minorities Committee, and Erika Toerzsoek, deputy chairperson of the Office of Hungarians Beyond the Border. Agota Gubas reports:

[Gubas] UVM Chairman Jozsef Kasza stressed: We want to live here in a human way, in equality with others. The Hungarians living here insist on their language, school, church, and history.

Referring to conflicts, he spoke of the conationals [nemzettarsak]: Those who cannot get on with their conationals facilitate the destruction of the Hungarian community. [passage omitted]

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